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Abstract	
	
Wright,	Anthony	M.	 The	Impact	of	Guerilla	Warfare	on	Democratic	Stability	in	Latin	America	
	
	
	 Throughout	the	history	of	Latin	America	there	have	been	many	revolutions	that	have	reshaped	the	political	fabric	of	the	entire	continent.	This	thesis	will	seek	to	explore	the	impact	that	the	following	three	movements	have	had:	The	Farabundo	Martí	National	Liberation	Front	(FMLN)	in	El	Salvador,	Las	Fuerzas	Armadas	de	la	República	de	Colombia	(FARC),	and	the	Tupamaros	(MLN-T)	in	Uruguay.	When	examining	these	three	movements	the	research	will	include	histories	and	discussions	of	each	revolution	and	text	regarding	the	strength	of	democracy	within	the	countries.	These	sections	will	then	be	supported	with	data	regarding	democracy	and	the	people’s	perspectives	on	democracy.	The	success	of	these	movements	will	be	judged	primarily	on	the	strength	of	the	democracy	in	the	country	they	are	based,	and	additionally	by	the	role	that	have	played	in	the	formation	of	these	democratic	principles.			 Research	into	the	guerilla	groups	will	discuss	their	origins,	and	the	primary	reasons	for	their	armed	resistance	to	their	governments.	In	addition,	these	sources	will	go	into	detail	regarding	the	individual	movement’s	histories.	The	data	from	the	censuses	from	source	like	LatinoBarómetro,	and	Latin	American	Public	Opinion	Project	(LAPOP)	will	help	provide	constructive	polling	and	data	on	the	strength	of	democracy	in	the	respective	countries.			 This	paper	will	seek	to	examine	the	guerilla	and	political	movements	in	a	historical	and	practical	perspective.	The	beginning	of	the	paper	will	examine	the	
	 		
	 v	
history	of	democratic	and	political	revolutions	and	provide	an	in	depth	description	of	the	history	of	guerilla	movements	in	Latin	America.	Then	the	evaluation	of	the	groups	will	provide	practical	examples	of	the	impact	that	guerilla	movements	have	had	on	democracy	within	Latin	America.	Finishing	with	a	discussion	of	the	impacts	that	the	groups	have	played	on	democracy	within	their	specific	countries.			
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Preface		
Formal	and	Informal	Political	Institutions:	Latin	America,	a	region	that	is	unique	in	its	political	ideologies,	has	many	different	factors	that	contribute	to	its	political	identity.	The	identity	has	experienced	many	changes	and	has	greatly	evolved	throughout	the	centuries	following	Simon	Bolivar’s	campaign	for	independence.1	One	such	tenant	of	Latin	American	politics	is	the	idea	that	individual	liberation	movements	can	significantly	impact	governmental	institutions.	Within	Latin	America	the	idea	of	popular	resistance	and	the	organization	of	individuals	to	express	political	discontent	has	been	commonplace	throughout	Latin	American	history.	The	organizations	that	consist	of	civil	society	are	not	formal	groups	and	are	listed	as	informal	organizations,	or	popular	movements	that	engage	many	followers.					 Informal	organizations,	which	derive	from	informal	institutions,	are	different	than	the	recognized	formal	governmental	institutions	that	they	seek	to	influence	through	their	actions.	Informal	organizations	are	bodies	that	differ	from	the	official	government,	and	work	in	areas	that	are	outside	of	official	channels.	Informal	institutions,	in	the	views	of	Professor	Gretchen	Helmke,	are	organized	non-governmental	groups	within	countries	that	have	significant	impacts	within	both	the	political	sphere	as	well	as	the	social	culture	of	a	given	nation.2	Informal	organizations	however	are	groups	that	are	separate	and	different	than	political																																																									1	Sherwell,	Guillermo	Antonio.	Simon	Bolivar	(the	liberator):	patriot,	warrior,	
statesman,	father	of	five	nations;	a	sketch	of	his	life	and	his	work.	Bolivarian	Society	of	Venezuela,	1921.	3.	
2 Helmke, Gretchen. Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin 
America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006. Print. 
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actors	that	the	informal	institutions	include.	As	Helmke	explores	with	Steven	Levitsky	,	the	difference	is	that	informal	organizations,	like	formal	organizations,	are	separate	to	informal	institutions	but	each	affects	the	other	significantly.3		 Informal	institutions	and	organizations	are	different	from	recognized	institutions	in	that	they	strive	to	enact	change	through	different	mediums	and	act	as	separate	autonomous	groups	to	the	national	institutions.	These	formal	groups,	which	include	the	formal	rules	of	political	institutions	that	run	sovereign	nations,	are	affected	by	the	efforts	of	both	informal	bodies.	Even	though	they	remain	as	outsiders	to	the	official	political	realm	and	the	formal	institutions	like	the	judiciary,	legislative,	and	executive,	they	still	impact	these	institutions.	The	informal	organizations,	which	are	similar	to	the	formal	organizations,	constitute	groups	of	people	involved	in	the	political	process,	include	groups	like	mafias	and	clans.4			 When	further	examining	the	definition	of	informal	organizations	there	are	several	similarities	between	informal	institutions	and	popular	movements.			The	definition	that	Helmke	and	Levitsky	provide	for	informal	organizations,	as	seen	above,	is	similar	to	what	Joe	Foweraker	and	Ann	Craig	explain	in	their	text	Popular	
Movements	and	Political	Change	in	Mexico.	In	their	book,	they	define	popular	movements	as	organizations	that	have	a	clear	social	composition	and	use	their	organization	as	a	machine	to	communicate	a	political	belief.5	These	political	beliefs,	
																																																								3	Helmke,	Gretchen,	and	Steven	Levitsky.	"Informal	institutions	and	comparative	politics:	A	research	agenda."	Perspectives	on	politics	2,	no.	04	(2004):	730.		4	Helmke,	"Informal	institutions	and	comparative	politics:	A	research	agenda."	732.		5	Foweraker,	Joe,	and	Ann	L.	Craig.	Popular	movements	and	political	change	in	
Mexico.	Boulder:	L.	Rienner	Publishers,	1990.	13.	
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as	is	the	case	with	the	informal	institutions,	are	voiced	by	popular	movements	directly	to	the	government.			 When	examining	the	definitions	above	for	formal	and	informal	institutions,	and	popular	movements,	most	groups	that	voice	discontent	against	the	government	are	clearly	defined.	However,	there	is	another	method	of	expressing	political	discontent	that	hasn’t	received	a	definition	but	is	still	a	social	movement.	The	social	movement	that	doesn’t	have	a	place	in	these	boundaries	are	guerilla	movements,	that	have	been	active	in	Latin	America	since	the	conquest	of	the	continent.	The	first	occurrence	of	guerilla	activity	through	indigenous	populations	and	the	Cacique	Enriquillo	of	the	Dominican	Republic	who	rebelled	against	the	Spanish	from	1519-1533.6	These	movements	have	since	proliferated	and	become	a	popular	method	to	express	political	discontent	and	to	seek	to	enact	change	on	the	political	institutions	throughout	the	continent.			 Guerilla	movements,	as	many	theorists,	like	Helmke	and	Levitsky	note,	are	very	similar	and	contain	many	attributes	of	informal	organizations,	but	aren’t	categorized	along	with	them	due	to	their	politically	violent	strategies.7	While	they	may	not	belong	in	the	category	of	informal	organizations,	they	affect	formal	government	institutions	and	seek	to	enact	political	change	through	their	actions.	Guerilla	movements,	like	popular	movements,	are	groups	that	seek	to	use	their	social	construction	to	impart	a	change	on	their	society.	As	social	movements,	and	organizations	of	people	who	are	striving	to	enact	political	change,	guerilla																																																									6	Castro,	Daniel.	Revolution	and	revolutionaries	guerrilla	movements	in	Latin	America.	Wilmington	(Del.):	SR	Books,	1999.	xvi.	7	Helmke,	Gretchen,	and	Steven	Levitsky.	"Informal	institutions	and	comparative	politics:	A	research	agenda."	735.	
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movements	are	a	successful	vehicle	that	people	use	to	give	voice	to	their	ideological	differences	with	the	government.			
Operating	Definition	for	Democracy	
	 As	the	ideas	of	setting	up	the	definition	of	the	different	forms	of	institutions	is,	the	creation	of	a	definition	for	democracy	is	equally	as	important	for	the	context	of	the	paper.	The	definition	for	democracy,	that	I	will	use	is	the	following,	
We define a democracy as a regime (a) that sponsors free and fair 
competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (b) that 
allows for inclusive adult citizenship; (c) that protects civil liberties 
and political rights; and (d) in which the elected governments really 
govern and the military is under civilian control.8 
 
This definition can be applied to Uruguay, and is in Colombia and El 
Salvador this definition is in the process of becoming applicable to their 
democratic system. Through this paper, I will contend that the guerilla 
groups, have through their efforts, brought their countries if not to this 
level of democracy, but closer towards the ideals listed above.  
Terrorism	vs.	Guerilla	Warfare			 When	examining	guerilla	warfare,	specifically	guerilla	groups	and	their	desired	transition	from	armed	groups	to	political	actors,	it	is	essential	to	provide	a	separate	of	the	definitions	for	guerillas	and	terrorists.	The	two	groups	appear	similar	in	that	they	both	use	violence	to	obtain	their	desired	goals	being	political,	ideological,	or	otherwise	change.	Yet	these	two	groups	are	different	and	should	not	
																																																								8	Munck,	Gerardo	L.,	ed.	Regimes	and	Democracy	in	Latin	America	:	Theories	and	Methods.	Oxford,	GBR:	Oxford	University	Press,	UK,	2007.	ProQuest	ebrary.	Web.	9	June	2015.	
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be	considered	in	the	same	categorical	definition	of	one	another.	Terrorism	and	guerilla	warfare	are	inherently	different	and	possess	ideals	separate	of	one	another.			 Terrorism,	unlike	guerilla	warfare,	prays	upon	the	weakness	of	non-combatants	or	civilian	targets.	This	is	to	say	that	terrorist	groups,	like	guerilla	movements	or	other	protests	groups,	seek	to	enact	a	political	change,	whether	that	be	political,	economic,	or	social,	they	seek	to	use	their	violent	actions	for	this	purpose.	These	organizations	seek	to	gain	media	attention	that	is	garnered	from	attacks	on	the	vulnerable	civilians	as	an	aspect	of	the	daily	life	to	create	this	change.	So,	an	operational	definition	that	Boaz	Ganor	uses	to	describe	terrorism	goes	as	follows,	“Terrorism	is	the	intentional	use	of,	or	threat	to	use	violence	against	civilians	or	against	civilian	targets,	in	order	to	attain	political	aims.”9	The	definition	further	explains	that	the	collateral	damage	to	citizens	from	an	attack	on	a	military	institution	cannot	be	defined	as	terrorism,	but	an	intentional	attack	on	uninvolved	civilians	can	be	considered	a	terrorist	acts.		 While	this	is	the	definition	of	terrorist	activities,	it	is	important	to	provide	a	definition	of	guerilla	warfare	and	what	constitutes	a	guerilla	fighter	in	comparison	to	the	provided	definition	for	terrorism.	Guerilla	warfare	is	described	as	a	military	tactic	that	is	adopted	by	a	weaker	force,	where	the	weaker	force	selects	the	place	and	time	of	the	conflict	against	a	larger	force.	In	addition	to	this	the	guerilla	force	locates	its	operations	in	liberated	areas	in	the	countryside	where	the	group	can	gain	members,	resources,	and	create	their	own	separate	institutions.	Guerilla	warfare,	as																																																									9	Ganor,	Boaz.	"	Defining	terrorism:	Is	one	man's	terrorist	another	man's	freedom	fighter?"	Media	Asia	29,	no.	3	(2002):	126.		
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Ganor’s	article	continues	to	explain,	takes	on	the	appearance	of	a	formal	conflict	between	two	national	armies.	Meaning	that	guerilla	warfare	seeks	to	wage	its	conflict	with	their	opposition	in	accordance	to	the	conventions	of	standardized	warfare.10		 Terrorism	and	guerilla	warfare	are	two	forms	of	non-conventional	conflicts,	but	besides	this	classification	their	definitions	are	very	different	from	one	another.	Terrorism	is	defined	as	the	targeting	of	civilians	and	using	action	that	inspire	wide	ranging	fear	from	non-combatant	civilian	populations,	which	terrorists	use	to	enact	political	change.	This	definition	is	significantly	different	than	the	military	tactics	of	guerilla	warfare,	which	is	an	irregular	and	smaller	form	of	conventional	warfare,	which	seeks	to	enact	a	political	change	on	society	or	government.	Ganor	however,	examines	one	aspect	of	terrorism	that	will	be	relevant	to	the	contents	of	the	paper.	This	topic	is	that	of	state	state-sponsored	terrorism,	which	in	Latin	America	is	a	very	important	concept	when	examining	guerilla	warfare	and	will	be	addressed	later	in	this	thesis.		
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									10	Ganor,	128.		
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Chapter	1:	History	of	Latin	American	Guerilla	Movements		
	 Guerilla	Warfare,	or	as	it	is	translated	into	Spanish	the	“little	war”,	was	coined	as	a	terminology	to	describe	the	irregular	and	untraditional	war	that	the	Spanish	were	waging	against	the	French	during	their	occupation	in	the	19th	century.11	Guerilla	movements	in	Latin	America	began	under	a	different	name,	“indigenous	uprisings”	and	the	first	of	these	was	the	aforementioned	Enriquillo	in	the	Dominican	Republic	against	the	Spanish	imperial	forces.	Enriquillo’s	rebellion	is	referred	to	as	the	first	armed	rebellion	of	the	peoples	of	Latin	America	against	an	oppressive	force.12	He	fought	for	the	Taino	indigenous	people	and	as	Bartolomé	de	Las	Casas	described,	was	a	leader	of	eminent	ability,	committed	to	defending	the	rights	of	his	people.13	Although	he	was	unsuccessful	in	his	efforts	to	rid	the	island	of	the	Spanish	oppressors,	his	rebellion	marked	the	first	resistance	in	Latin	American	from	an	indigenous	group	against	their	imperial	oppressors.14			 Enriquillo’s	success	would	inspire	an	uprising	two	centuries	later	led	by	another	indigenous	man,	called	Tupac	Amaru	II	in	1780.15	The	rebellion	that	Tupac	began	was	to	reassert	the	Inca	Empire	in	the	Peruvian	Andean	region.	Additionally,	based	his	desires	to	reassert	the	dominion	of	the	Incan	empire,	Tupac	sought	to	
																																																								11	Castro,	Daniel.	Revolution	and	revolutionaries	guerrilla	movements	in	Latin	
America.	Wilmington	(Del.):	SR	Books,	1999.	xvi.		12	Altman,	Ida.	"The	Revolt	of	Enriquillo	and	the	Historiography	of	Early	Spanish	America."	The	Americas.	4th	ed.	Vol.	63.	Cambridge	University	Press.	587.	13	Altman,	589.	14	Altman,	614.	15	Castro,	1.	
	 		
	 8	
rebel	against	the	Bourbon	reforms	of	1776.16	These	reforms	saw	the	removal	of	Creoles	from	governmental	positions	in	favor	of	European	supervisors	and	the	increase	of	taxes	on	different	goods.17		Tupac	felt	that	he	was	fighting	to	bring	back	the	Incan	Empire	and	described	himself	as	the	descendent	to	the	Incan	Emperor.18	This	insurrection	became	a	bloody	contest	between	Tupac’s	indigenous	followers	and	the	colonial	Spaniards.	Tupac’s	fight	would	end	in	1781	with	his	capture	and	execution,	which	included	quartering	and	then	the	burning	of	his	remains	as	an	example.19					 Tupac’s	rebellion	was	a	struggle	for	the	representation	of	the	Indigenous	nation	and	the	Indian	people	of	Peru	before	the	colonialization	of	the	Spanish	Empire.	This	movement	sought	to	use	war	as	a	way	to	preserve	their	society	and	the	survival	of	their	culture.	The	impact	of	the	rebellion	was	significant	and	like	other	rebellions,	by	Indian	nations	against	colonialism,	bred	contempt	by	both	groups.	As	Daniel	Castro	notes,		The	massacres	of	Spanish	immigrants,	especially	of	those	who	had	lived	among	the	Indians,	further	widened	the	gap	between	the	colonizers	and	the	colonized.	Old	images	of	imperial	authority	and	king	had	begun	to	dissolve.20		The	rebellion	was	an	act	of	protest,	and	the	outcome	may	have	been	defeat	but	Tupac	and	his	followers	expressed	their	discontent	with	the	colonial	power.	This	
																																																								16	Castro,	Daniel.	Revolution	and	revolutionaries	guerrilla	movements	in	Latin	
America.	Wilmington	(Del.):	SR	Books,	1999.	3-4.	17	Castro,	5.		18	Castro,	6.	19	Castro,	7.		20	Castro,	8.		
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rebellion	was	the	act	of	a	group	of	marginalized	members	of	society	using	violence	as	a	manner	of	political	expression.			 Some	60	years	after	the	failure	of	Tupac	Amaru	II’s	rebellion	in	Peru	there	was	a	peasant	insurgency	in	the	Yucatan	province	of	Mexico	near	what	is	now	the	Belize	border.	This	insurgency,	which	began	in	1847,	was	referred	to	as	the	Caste	Wars,	a	war	that	was	being	waged	by	the	Yucatan	province	for	a	multitude	of	reasons.	The	movement’s	main	leader,	Santiago	Iman,	was	a	wealthy	caudillo,	or	merchant,	and	the	movement	was	fighting	primarily	to	resist	taxes	coming	from	central	Mexico,	but	also	to	try	and	get	control	over	their	territories.21	This	movement	gave	rise	to	the	first	signs	of	guerilla	warfare	within	Mexico,		Only	then	did	the	rebels	discover	their	true	calling	as	guerilla	fighters.	Retreating	with	their	forces	to	the	eastern	rain	forests,	the	leaders	of	this	conflict	rallied	their	soldiers	by	instituting	the	religious	cult	of	the	Speaking	Cross…	Supported	by	the	unyielding	commands	of	their	oracle,	the	cruzob	(people	of	the	cross)	instituted	a	society	of	total	mobilization:	the	men	divided	their	time	between	farming	and	military	service,	while	the	women	did	household	work	but	also	prepared	the	supplies	for	campaigns.22			The	people	of	the	Speaking	Cross	were	successful	in	their	uprising	and	became	a	separate	autonomous	region	within	Mexico.	Although	this	autonomous	body	would	dissolve	and	splinter	after	a	half-century	or	so,	their	victory	was	a	huge	milestone.	The	method	through	which	the	Speaking	Cross	attained	their	success	marked	the	successful	introduction	of	guerilla	warfare	and	rural	insurgency	to	Central	America.		
	
																																																									21	Castro,	14.	22	Castro,	15.		
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Emiliano	Zapata	and	the	Mexican	Revolution:		
	 Emiliano	Zapata,	a	rural	leader,	who	was	born	into	the	Mexican	state	of	Morelos,	was	a	revolutionary	through	and	through.	In	1909,	he	was	elected	by	his	village	to	be	a	President	of	the	defense	committee.23	His	requests	to	the	government,	as	the	president	of	the	committee,	were	not	met,	and	Zapata’s	response	was	to	peacefully	occupy	the	lands	that	the	government	would	not	relinquish	back	to	the	people	of	the	village.	In	the	year	1910,	Francisco	Madero	initiated	a	revolution	against	President	Porfirio	Díaz	on	the	grounds	of	reflective	suffrage	and	no	reelection.	Zapata	respected	this	insurrection	due	to	the	movements	Plan	of	San	Luís.24	The	Plan	of	San	Luís	was	a	political	manifesto	that	sought	to	redistribute	land	to	smaller	owners,	which	had	been	illegally	stolen.	With	these	San	Luís	goals	in	mind,	Zapata	contacted	Madero	and	asked	to	become	part	of	the	movement,	and	by	doing	so	brought	revolution	to	state	of	Morelos.25			 Following	several	swift	conflicts	the	revolutionaries	succeeded	in	their	uprising	against	the	government	in	1911.26	This	victory	against	the	Díaz	dictatorship	was	in	name	only,	and	the	revolutionaries	had	to	deal	with	the	federal	combatants	remaining	active	in	the	countryside.	Their	differences	reached	a	boiling	point	due	to	Madero,	who	became	president	elect	and	rejected	all	of	Zapata’s	demands	for	land	reform.	Following	the	open	rejection	of	Zapata’s	demands	Madero	
																																																								23	Castro,	24.	24	Castro,	25.	25	Knight,	Alan.	The	Mexican	Revolution.	Vol.	1Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1986.	310.		26	Castro,	25.	
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endorsed	a	military	campaign,	led	by	Victoriano	Huerta,	against	the	Zapatistas.27	Zapata	and	his	followers	resisted	the	efforts	of	the	federal	forces	in	the	Morelos	region.	Upon	assuming	office,	Madero	moved	away	from	agricultural	reform	and	sought	to	enact	more	elite	focused	political	change.	Due	to	his	political	ineptitude	and	how	he	turned	on	his	allies	like	Zapatista	upon	assuming	office,	he	was	easily	ousted	by	a	Huerta	backed	military	coup	in	1913	and	was	executed	that	same	year.28			 By	the	year	1914	the	Zapatistas	and	the	followers	of	Pancho	Villa	and	Venustiano	Carranza	had	successfully	defeated	the	federal	forces	of	the	Huerta	coup	and	took	control	of	Mexico	once	again.29	This	control,	similarly	to	the	last	period	of	governance,	was	marred	by	political	strife.	This	strife	was	mostly	focused	on	the	ideological	differences	between	Carranza	and	Zapata	regarding	agrarian	reform.30	Carranza	believed	that	the	government	could	not	address	the	issue	of	agrarian	reform	and	went	so	far	as	to	say	that	the	re-appropriation	of	lands	was	illegal	for	the	government	to	perform.			 For	the	following	four	years	the	Zapatistas	waged	war	against	the	Carrancistas	pushing	the	government	follow	through	on	it’s	promised	land	reforms.31	The	Zapatistas	however	faced	a	very	difficult	struggle	in	this	sense	because	the	Carrancistas	were	better	armed	and	had	better	access	to	supplies.	This	however	did	not	stop	Zapata	and	his	followers,	who,	through	textbook	guerilla	
																																																								27	Castro,	26.	28	Castro,	28	29	Castro,	29	30	Castro,	31-33	31	Knight,	Alan.	The	Mexican	Revolution.	Vol.1,	1986.	317.		
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warfare	methods,	fought	the	superior	Carrancista	forces.32	While	the	efforts	of	the	Zapatistas	were	being	rewarded	with	success	on	April	10,	1919	the	movement	suffered	a	crippling	loss.	While	riding	to	negotiate	with	an	officer	of	the	Carrancistas	who	was	claimed	to	be	defecting,	Zapata	was	shot	dead,	leaving	the	movement	without	it’s	leader	and	forcing	it	to	the	margins	of	Mexican	political	scene.33		 In	1920	Carranza	met	the	same	fate,	as	he	was	killed	by	Álvaro	Obregón’s	forces,	who	became	president	of	Mexico	until	1924.34	Zapata	had	been	killed,	but	he	remained	the	embodiment	of	the	Zapatista	armed	resistance	movement	in	Mexican	history	seeking	to	use	its	influence	to	enact	social	change.	Zapata’s	influence	as	a	guerilla	fighter	and	charismatic	leader,	who	represented	the	desires	of	the	peasants	and	farmers	of	Mexico	for	agrarian	reform,	became	one	of	the	revolution’s	most	defining	features.	Through	his	efforts	and	the	efforts	of	the	Mexican	Revolution	the	idea	that	guerilla	movements	could	experience	not	only	minor	success	but	also	overthrown	entire	governments	became	real.	The	Zapatistas	left	a	lasting	mark	on	Mexican	social	movements,	and	that	mark	can	still	be	seen	today.		
Jacobo	Árbenz	Guzmán	and	the	26th	of	July	Movement:	
	 Colonel	Árbenz,	who	led	the	October	Revolution	in	1944,	which	overthrew	the	military	dictator	Jorge	Ubico,	successfully	reinstating	democratic	elections	and	rule	to	Guatemala.35	Upon	his	ascendency	to	the	presidency	he	attempted	to	bring	about	social	reforms	that	revolved	around	assisting	the	impoverished	and	enacting	more	land	reforms.	His	efforts,	and	the	efforts	of	his	government	however	weren’t																																																									32	Knight,	Alan	The	Mexican	Revolution.	Vol.	2.	362	33	Knight,	Alan.	The	Mexican	Revolution.	Vol.	2.	1986.	367.	34Castro,	40		35	Gott,	Richard.	Guerrilla	movements	in	Latin	America.	London:	Nelson,	1970.	5.	
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enough	to	aid	the	poor	and	were	considered	too	drastic	to	avoid	the	attention	of	the	United	Fruit	Company,	who	felt	their	wealth	and	financial	security	being	endangered	by	a	“socialist”.	The	attention	that	the	Árbenz	government	attracted	for	itself	was	from	the	U.S.	on	behalf	of	their	United	States	industries	heavily	involved	within	Guatemala.	The	resulting	statement	from	the	U.S.	State	Department,	regarding	Guatemala	at	the	time,	was	that	they	were	disappointed	in	the	country’s	voting	within	the	Organization	of	American	States,	Rio	Defense	Pact.	Additionally,	the	U.S.	was	alarmed	that	Guatemala	was	purchasing	guns	from	Eastern	European	nations,	to	protect	itself	from	different	internal	and	international	threats.36	The	reality	was	much	different,	according	to	Richard	Gott,	author	of	the	Guerilla	Movements	in	Latin	
America.	The	issue	involved	the	Guatemalan	government’s	distribution	of	fallow	lands	belonging	to	the	United	Fruit	Company,	and	Árbenz’s	“soft”	stance	against	communism.37		These	realities	led	to	the	overthrow	of	the	democratically	elected	government	of	Jacobo	Árbenz	Guzmán	by	a	military	coup,	led	by	Carlos	Castillo	Armas,	which	was	backed	by	the	CIA.38			 The	importance	of	this	event	to	future	guerilla	movements	is	important	as	the	initial	response	to	this	overthrow	was	that	even	if	guerilla	movements	and	political	uprising	occur,	there	is	the	ever	constant	threat	of	the	U.S.	intervention.	The	other	concern	for	revolutionaries,	as	Gott	notes	is	that	unless	the	revolution	goes	all	the	way	and	shuts	down	the	wealthy	ruling	class	and	suppress	the	governmental																																																									36	Gott,	5.	37	Gott,	5-6.	38	Gott,	3.	
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structure	within	the	nation,	there	is	the	threat	of	U.S.	intervention	will	always	be	present.	At	the	time	of	the	military	coup,	President	Árbenz	had	been	advised	by	a	future	revolutionary,	who	suggested	that	he	fight	against	the	coup	for	the	rights	he	desired	for	the	people	of	Guatemala.	This	guerilla	fighter	wanted	him	to	arm	the	peasants	and	workers	to	fight	the	imperial	threat	posed	by	the	U.S.	backed	Guatemalan	Carlos	Armas,	this	advice	came	from	none	other	than	Ernesto	Che	Guevara.39				 While	a	popular	rebellion	in	Guatemala	took	place	later	in	1960	and	was	led	by	two	army	officers,	Luis	Turcios	and	Marco	Yon,	its	influence	on	Latin	America	cannot	be	understated.40	While	the	overthrow	of	the	Árbenz	government	took	place	in	1954	as	was	previously	mentioned,	it	was	an	event	that	inspired	Che	Guevara,	an	advisor	to	President	Árbenz,	to	continue	fighting	for	justice	in	other	countries.	Upon	the	overturn	of	the	Árbenz	government	Guevara	had	to	flee	to	Mexico	and	living	off	the	streets	of	Mexico	City.41		Che	was	in	luck	however,	because	Mexico	City	was	a	refugee	for	other	budding	revolutionaries,	most	specifically	Cubans	who	fled	from	the	Fulgencio	Batista	regime.	It	was	during	this	time	that	Che	met	with	Fidel	and	Raúl	Castro	and	joined	the	revolutionary	movement	that	would	alter	the	modern	history	of	Latin	American	history,	the	26th	of	July	movement.42			 The	26th	of	July	Movement,	began	as	a	small	group	of	freedom	fighters	who	met	and	trained	in	Mexico,	seeking	to	end	the	Fulgencio	Batista	dictatorship	in	Cuba.																																																									39	Gott,	6	40	Gott,	20	41	Ross,	John.	"Che’s	Mexican	Legacy."	Www.counterpunch.org.	February	26,	2016.	Accessed	January	20,	2017.	http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/10/19/che-s-mexican-legacy/.	42	Ross,	2	
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The	movement	acquired	its	name	from	the	unsuccessful	assault	on	the	Moncada	barracks	in	Santiago	de	Cuba,	led	by	the	Castro’s	on	the	26th	of	July	1953.43		The	survivors	of	the	Moncada	attack	and	others	travelled	in	the	Granma,	a	leaky	and	unstable	yacht	that	Fidel	Castro,	the	leader	of	the	movement,	had	acquired	their	return	to	Cuba.	On	December	2nd	of	1956	the	small	detachment	landed	in	Cuba	and	were	immediately	ambushed.44	Following	this	crushing	blow	the	surviving	members	of	the	group	fled	to	the	Sierra	Maestra,	a	heavily	wooded	mountain	area	to	recover	and	plan	their	next	course	of	action.	From	their	mountainous	position,	they	coordinated	with	their	clandestine	urban	cohort	in	Santiago	de	Cuba	to	plan	minor	battles	to	raise	the	confidence	and	support	for	the	movement	in	the	Sierra	Maestra.45		 Following	series	of	minor	victories,	they	took	full	advantage	of	media	coverage	from	the	New	York	Times46		to	grow	in	size	as	their	skirmishes	grew	as	well.	These	small	victories	solidified	the	movement	and	their	purpose	to	eliminate	the	Batista	regime	from	power.	In	the	spring	of	1958,	following	many	victories	from	the	small	band	of	guerillas,	the	Cuban	people	began	supporting	the	movement.47	Following	the	development	of	a	unified	front,	which	included	the	Auténticos,	Ortodoxo	party,	the	Directorio	Revolucionario,	and	the	Montecristi	movement	the	revolution	pressed	on	to	remove	the	Batista	regime.48	This	final	press	became	the																																																									43	Goldenberg,	Boris.	The	Cuban	revolution	and	Latin	America.	New	York:	Praeger,	1965.	153-154	44	Goldenberg,	155	45	Goldenberg,	155	46	Goldenberg,	156	47	Goldenberg,	159	48	Goldenberg,	161	
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final	offensive	in	December	of	1958	and	with	it	the	Batista	fled	the	country	and	the	infrastructure	collapsed.	In	January	of	1959	Fidel	Castro	and	the	26th	of	July	movement	toppled	the	Batista	regime	and	took	control	of	Cuba.49						 Upon	seizing	power	in	Cuba,	the	movement	immediately	enacted	changes	to	the	policies	that	had	suppressed	the	country	under	Batista’s	regime.	The	revolutionary	government	sought	to	champion	social	revolution,	which	would	include	agrarian	reformations,	literacy	reforms,	the	nationalization	of	important	Cuban	industries,	and	the	desire	to	promote	an	industrial	Cuban	economy.50	The	influence	of	the	Soviet	Union	on	these	policies,	and	their	Marxist	ideologies	is	a	point	of	great	importance	to	the	origin	of	guerilla	movements,	especially	during	the	Cold	War.		
The	Red	Scare	and	U.S.	Intervention:	
	 The	U.S.	policy	towards	Latin	America,	in	context	of	the	feared	spread	of	Marxist	and	leftist	beliefs,	is	another	component	that	is	crucial	to	understanding	guerilla	warfare	in	Latin	America,	and	the	purpose	of	their	struggles.	The	development	of	these	policies	began	following	World	War	II	and	the	development	of	the	Soviet	Union	as	a	political	rival	to	the	U.S.	following	the	collapse	of	the	Axis	Alliance.	The	predominant	theory	that	would	initiate	this	interaction	would	be	the	development	theory,	which	sought	to	increase	the	interaction	and	financial	aid	that	the	U.S.	provided	Latin	American.	Development	theory	operated	on	the	pretext	of	supporting	the	economic	growth	of	“third”	world	countries,	but	this	idealism	was																																																									49	Goldenberg,	163	50	Wright,	Thomas	C.	Latin	America	in	the	era	of	the	Cuban	Revolution.	New	York:	Praeger,	1991.	
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merely	a	cover	for	full	blown	U.S.	intervention	throughout	the	entire	region	against	Latin	American	governments51.			 						The	intervention	of	the	U.S.	in	Latin	America	throughout	the	20th	century	should	not	however	be	viewed	as	an	operation	to	assist	local	governments	develop	more	complete	economies,	but	rather	as	a	political	action	reacting	to	the	perceived	communist	threat.	The	most	notable	of	these	interactions	were	the	removal	of	Salvador	Allende	in	Chile	and	the	Bay	of	Pigs	invasion	in	Cuba,	but	the	U.S.	involvement	went	deeper	than	these	two	incidents.52		The	actions	of	the	U.S.	government	were	not	in	response	to	any	direct	threat	from	the	countries	in	question	or	even	from	Russia	using	the	countries	as	a	base	of	operations.	The	U.S.	was	acting	in	defense	of	a	national	image	of	strengthen	against	the	perceived	threat	of	the	spread	of	Communism	throughout	the	world.			 Their	actions	in	Latin	America,	as	Grow’s	text	explains,	were	a	show	of	international	strength	to	deter	the	soviets,		…	U.S.	leaders	worried	that	failure	on	their	part	to	maintain	firm	hegemonic	control	over	the	United	States’	traditional	sphere	of	influence	in	the	Western	Hemisphere…would	be	interpreted	by	other	governments	as	an	indication	of	U.S.	weakness,	a	sign	perhaps	that	the	United	States	no	longer	had	the	capability,	or	the	will,	to	project	its	power	in	defense	of	interests.53		The	U.S.	therefore	had	to	pursue	these	hardline	policies,	due	in	large	part	to	the	advice	from	Henry	Kissinger,	who	served	as	Secretary	of	State	and	National	Security																																																									51	Hunt,	Michael	H.	Ideology	and	U.S.	foreign	policy.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	press,	1987.	159-160	52	Grow,	Michael.	U.S.	Presidents	and	Latin	American	Interventions:	pursuing	regime	
change	in	the	cold	war.	Kansas:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2012.	186-187.		53	Grow,	U.S.	Presidents	and	Latin	American	Interventions,	187.	
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advisor	for	Presidents	Nixon	and	Ford,	as	well	as	unofficial	advisor	to	many	leaders.54	Kissinger	would	continue	on	to	clarify	this	idea	even	further	with	his	own	doctrine,	the	Kissinger	Commission	of	1984,	where	he	stated	that	“the	triumph	of	hostile	forces	in	what	the	Soviets	call	the	‘strategic	rear’	of	the	United	States	would	read	as	a	sign	of	U.S.	impotence”.55	With	all	of	this	taken	into	account	the	U.S.	foreign	policy	into	the	Latin	American	region	reflected	a	very	militant,	and	non-supportive	stance	towards	leftist,	democratic	governments	that	were	perceived	as	communist	friendly	governments.	
Conclusion:		 The	importance	of	the	Cuban	Revolution	was	that	the	imperial	efforts	of	the	United	States	within	Latin	America	had	been	successfully	challenged.	Cuba	was	a	nation	that	had	thrown	of	the	shackles	of	the	imperialism	and	had	done	so	through	an	armed	conflict	led	by	the	26th	of	July	movement	and	its	leaders	Che	Guevara	and	Fidel	Castro.	In	the	following	decades,	the	Cuban	nation	would	face	great	difficulties	and	punishment	from	the	United	States	for	the	success	of	the	revolution.	Yet,	no	matter	how	severe	U.S.	policy	in	Cuba	was,	the	revolutionary	government	would	not	cave	in,	and	constantly	strove	to	live	up	to	the	ideals	that	they	waged	the	revolution	to	institute.			 Latin	American	countries	would	view	the	Cuban	Revolution	with	a	sense	of	pride	and	unity.	Throughout	the	Latin	American,	the	U.S.	backed	dictatorships	and	false	democracies	had	reigned	uncontested.	Cuba,	and	its	revolution	would	inspire	not	only	leftist	throughout	Latin	America	but	would	serve	as	an	inspiration	for																																																									54	Grow,	U.S.	Presidents	and	Latin	American	Interventions,	98.		55	Grow,	U.S.	Presidents	and	Latin	American	Interventions,	187.		
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social	movements	globally.	The	revolution	was	unique	because	it	was	a	guerilla	movement	that	achieved	its	goal	and	became	a	sovereign	nation,	free	of	dictatorship.	Through	their	success,	they	inspired	many	other	guerilla	movements	throughout	Latin	America	to	form	and	resist	their	oppressive	governments.		
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Chapter	Two:	The	Tupamaros	and	Uruguay	
History	of	the	Tupamaros:		 In	1971,	a	group	known	as	the	Frente	Amplio	(FA),	or	the	Broad	Front	in	Uruguay	came	into	existence.	The	Frente	Amplio	represented	a	democratic	coalition	of	around	12	fractured	leftist	political	parties.	The	movement	really	began	to	gain	traction	in	the	early	1970’s	but	swiftly	lost	a	lot	of	popular	support	because	of	the	terrorist	tactics	that	they	were	employing.	The	Tupamaros	(Movimiento	de	Liberación	Nacional-Tupamaros)	were	not	like	other	guerilla	movements;	they	were	more	of	a	political	movement	that	decided	to	take	up	arms	as	their	method	of	protest.	They	wanted	to	move	the	country	away	from	an	authoritarian	dictatorship	and	help	save	the	workers	from	market	capitalism.	However,	with	the	1973	military	coup	d’état,	most	democratic	rights	guaranteed	in	the	1967	Uruguayan	constitution	were	not	respected,	leading	effectively	to	the	death	of	the	FA	after	little	over	a	decade	in	existence.56			 The	Tupamaros	officially	began	organizing	in	late	1962	into	early	1963,	and	were	led	during	their	initial	formation	by	Raúl	Sendric	and	other	disgruntled	members	of	the	Socialist	party.57	The	name	for	the	movement	is	widely	believed	to	have	been	taken	from	the	revolution	of	Tupac	Amaru	against	the	Spanish	Empire	in	1572.58	In	Martin	Weinstein’s	book	he	addresses	the	overall	structure	of	Uruguayan	
																																																								56	Garcé	Adolfo	“De	guerrilleros	a	gobernantes:	El	proceso	de	adaptacio	́n	del	MLN-Tupamaros	a	la	legalidad	y	a	la	competencia	electoral	en	Uruguay	(1985-2009)”	Hal:	1-24.	57	Weinstein,	Martin.	Uruguay:	the	politics	of	failure.	Westport,	CT:	Greenwood	Press,	1975.	120.	58	Weinstein,	121.		
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democracy,	specifically	drawing	attention	to	the	lack	of	representation	that	the	Tupamaros	had	in	government.	Weinstein	quotes	the	MLN-T’s	first	public	statement	to	the	nation	in	1967,		For	these	reasons,	we	have	placed	ourselves	outside	the	law.	This	the	only	honest	action	when	the	law	is	not	equal	for	all;	when	the	law	exists	to	defend	the	spurious	interests	of	a	minority	in	detriment	to	the	majority;	when	the	law	works	against	the	country’s	progress;	when	even	those	who	have	created	it	place	themselves	outside	of	it,	with	impunity,	whenever	it	is	convenient	for	them.59			The	quote	continues	to	introduce	the	movement	and	announce	the	beginning	of	the	Tupamaros	guerrilla	warfare	to	fighting	the	dictatorship.	The	movement	came	out	with	this	charged	statement	to	show	that	they	felt	it	necessary	to	create	an	armed	rebellion	to	fight	for	their	rights.	The	desire	of	the	movement	to	promote	the	economic	well-being	and	political	stability	of	the	country	would	motivate	the	group	to	wage	an	armed	guerilla	war	against	the	Uruguayan	government	for	many	years.					 The	Tupamaros,	unlike	other	guerilla	movements	in	the	past	decade,	such	as	the	Cuban	Revolution,	sought	to	become	an	urban	guerilla	fighting	group.	This	idea	of	urban	resistance	went	completely	against	the	mold	of	guerilla	fighting	at	the	time,	as	created	by	Che	Guevara	through	his	own	book,	Che	Guevara	Guerrilla	Warfare,	which	he	wrote	following	the	Cuban	revolution.	In	his	Guevara’s	book	on	Guerilla	Warfare,	he	discusses	three	major	components	to	irregular	warfare,	the	third	of	which	was	the	necessity	to	have	a	countryside	base	of	operations	to	concentrate	the	development	of	your	forces.60	The	Tupamaros	however	did	not	feel	that	Uruguay	was	the	environment	for	a	rural-based	revolution,	as	was	the	case	in	the	Cuban																																																									59	Weinstein,	121.	60	Guevara,	Che.	Che	Guevara	guerrilla	warfare.	New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1969.	14.	
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Revolution,	which	relied	on	mountains,	trees,	and	rallying	the	peasants,	and	rural	citizens.	The	Tupamaros	saw	an	opportunity	in	Uruguay	to	develop	an	urban	resistance	in	Montevideo	and	began	an	urban	guerilla	war	against	the	dictatorship.		 They	felt	that	this	method	would	be	very	successful	due	to	the	design	of	Montevideo,	and	the	greater	metropolitan	area	of	the	city.	In	Daniel	Castro’s	book,	he	cites	an	anonymous	interview	with	a	Tupamaro	fighter,	where	the	fighter	addressed	questions	regarding	the	strategies,	policies	and	beliefs	of	the	group.	One	such	question	addressed	the	idea	of	the	urban	revolution	in	Uruguay,		Q:	And	for	the	urban	struggle,	do	the	conditions	exist?	A:	Montevideo	is	a	city	sufficiently	large	and	polarized	by	social	struggles	to	give	cover	to	the	vast	active	commando	contingent.	It	constitutes	a	far	better	framework	than	that	which	other	revolutionary	movements	have	had	for	the	urban	struggle.61							 	The	Tupamaros	underwent	a	military	campaign	that	sought	to	unite	other	social	movements,	labor	unions,	and	the	impoverished	Uruguayans	who	the	desperate	economic	situation	most	significantly	affected.62	The	urban	guerillas,	however,	did	not	achieve	their	goal	of	bringing	down	the	government,	and	following	the	capture	of	several	important	leaders	in	1972,	the	movement	collapsed	entirely.63	Following	the	defeat	of	the	Tupamaros	the	government	of	Uruguay	took	an	even	more	oppressive	which	led	to	the	prolonged	imprisonment	and	torture	of	captured	Tupamaros.		
																																																									61	Castro,	Daniel.	Revolution	and	revolutionaries	guerrilla	movements	in	Latin	
America.	Wilmington	(Del.):	SR	Books,	1999.	112.	62	Brum,	Pablo.	The	Robin	Hood	guerrillas:	the	epic	journey	of	Uruguay's	Tupamaros.	Charleston,	SC:	CreateSpace,	2014.	24.	63	Brum,	282.		
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American	Intervention	in	Uruguay	
	 U.S	intervention	throughout	Latin	America	has	been	a	prolific	and	dramatic	occurrence	and	Uruguay	was	no	exception	during	the	1960’s	and	1970’s.	Uruguay,	widely	referred	to	as	the	Switzerland	of	the	South	American	nations	due	to	its	history	of	social	democracy	and	peaceful	society	had	been	violence	free	since	1848.	This	period	of	peace	was	destined	to	fall	however	because	of	U.S.	interests	in	hemispheric	hegemony	and	their	intervention	policies	that	supports	this	dictatorship.64			 The	initial	intervention	from	the	U.S.	in	Uruguay	took	place	in	the	Uruguayan	police	force	throughout	the	nation.	The	U.S.	Office	of	Public	Safety	(OPS)	began	training	police	officers	in	Uruguay	and	additionally	hundreds	of	officers	were	encouraged	by	the	OPS	to	travel	to	the	International	Police	Academy	and	the	U.S.	Army	School	of	the	Americas	in	Panama	to	gain	further	U.S.	training.		The	OPS,	which	had	functioned	in	other	“struggling”	democracies	like	Vietnam,	had	gained	a	negative	reputation	for	its	aggressive	torture	techniques.	While	the	OPS	were	supposed	to	maintain	an	advisory	role	to	the	Uruguayan	police	force,	in	1966	under	the	leadership	of	William	Cantrell,	the	head	of	the	program	at	the	time	and	a	covert	CIA	officer,	moved	to	marginalize	the	police	forces.		This	marginalization	took	the	form	of	the	National	Directorate	of	Information	and	Intelligence	(DNII),	which	was	Cantrell’s	organization	that	replaced	the	
																																																								64	McSherry,	Patrice	J.	"Death	squads	as	parallel	forces:	Uruguay,	Operation	Condor,	and	the	United	States."	Journal	of	Third	World	Studies,	2007.	Association	of	Global	South	Studies.	4.	
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Uruguayan	led	department	of	Alejandro	Otero.65	Otero	was	the	head	of	the	Uruguayan	police	force	and	in	1966,	with	the	successful	marginalization	of	Otero	and	the	anti-torture	Uruguayan	police	force,	Cantrell	began	torturing	political	prisoners.	With	the	flood	gates	of	torture	opened	in	Uruguay	the	OPS	brought	in	Dan	Mitrione,	who	was	an	advisor	on	Latin	America	to	the	CIA,	to	lead	the	Public	safety	office	in	Montevideo	and	train	the	officers.	Mitrione	had	been	heavily	active	in	the	South	American	police	forces,	and	previously	had	trained	the	Brazilian	police	forces	in	interrogation	and	torture	methods	before	arriving	in	Uruguay.		Under	Mitrione	the	cases	of	torture	increased	and	in	an	interview	in	1970	Ortero	publicly	denounced	Mitrione’s	methods	and	noted	his	scientific	and	psychological	torture	methods.	One	Cuban	operative	within	the	CIA,	Manuel	Hevia	Conculluela,	describe	one	of	Mitrione’s	methods	in	his	book	Pasaporte	11333,	Eight	
Years	With	the	C.I.A.66	In	it	Conculluela	described	a	sound	proofed	room,	where	Mitrione	and	his	men	performed	different	demonstrations	of	torture	methods,	using	electric	currents	and	chemical	substances	on	four	homeless	beggars.67	In	addition	to	the	U.S.	sponsored	police	brutality	and	torture	methods,	U.S.	intervention	took	on	another	form,	which	was	the	development	and	support	of	death	squadrons.		In	a	declassified	telegram	from	1971,	the	U.S.	ambassador	to	Uruguay,	Charles	Adair,	discussed	the	existence	of	death	squads	with	important	Uruguayan	Ministers	of	the	Interior.	The	following	quote	acknowledges	that	not	only	did	the	Uruguayan	government	know	these	squads	existed,	but	that	both	governments																																																									65	McSherry,	5-6.	66	Langguth,	A.J.	"Torture's	Teachers."	New	York	Times	(New	York),	June	11,	1979.	67	McSherry,	"Death	squads	as	parallel	forces:	Uruguay,	Operation	Condor,	and	the	United	States."	6.	
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endorsed	their	existence,	"Re	counterterrorism,	particularly	formation	of	'death	squads'	as	tactic,	I	said	I	would	not	presume	to	pass	judgment	on	developments	in	Uruguay	..."68	The	ambassador	would	later	add	that	he	told	the	officials	that	such	tactics	weren’t	effective,	but	did	not	recant	the	statement	he	had	made	regarding	death	squads.	Both	the	U.S.	and	Uruguay	have	admitted	that	the	death	squads	existed	and	that	they	were	an	active	component	of	counterinsurgency	efforts	in	Uruguay.69		 The	existence	of	death	squads	became	even	more	apparent	when,	in	1972,	the	Tupamaros	kidnapped	and	questioned	Nelson	Bardesio,	who	had	been	OPS	director	Cantrell’s	driver.	In	their	line	of	questioning,	which	Bardesio	acknowledged	was	without	violence,	he	revealed	that	the	death	squads	were	prevalent	throughout	the	Uruguayan	police	force	and	the	DNII.	He	gave	the	Tupamaros	the	names	of	officers	Hugo	Campos	Hermida,	Victor	Castiglioni,	and	admitted	to	his	own	involvement	in	the	squads.	The	other	two	officers	he	indicated	were	important	members	of	the	DNII.	Castiglioni	was	the	director	of	intelligence	for	the	DNII	and	Hermida	was	in	charge	of	investigations	for	the	DNII.	Bardesio	also	revealed	that	these	death	squads	were	responsible	for	assassinations	and	bomb	attacks	against	socialist	and	communist	leaders.70			 These	two	examples	of	U.S.	intervention,	coupled	with	the	idea	of	the	U.S.’s	desire	for	hemispheric	control,	led	to	the	manipulation	of	the	Uruguayan	elections.	This	interference,	which	was	spearheaded	by	President	Richard	Nixon	and	his																																																									68	McSherry,	7.	69	McSherry,	9.	70	McSherry,	"Death	squads	as	parallel	forces:	Uruguay,	Operation	Condor,	and	the	United	States."	7	
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National	Security	Advisor	Henry	Kissinger,	encouraged	the	Brazilian	and	Argentine	militaries	to	take	an	active	role	in	sabotaging	the	Frente	Amplio	political	coalition.	In	a	meeting	between	Kissinger	and	Brazilian	dictator	Emílio	Médici,	Kissinger	commented	on	the	status	of	the	left	in	Uruguay	and	Bolivia,	"in	areas	of	mutual	concern	such	as	the	situations	in	Uruguay	and	Bolivia,	close	cooperation	and	parallel	approaches	can	be	very	helpful	for	our	common	objectives."71	This	support,	and	the	effective	destruction	of	the	left	by	the	army	and	police	forces	in	Uruguay,	led	the	country	to	take	a	dramatic	turn,	which	was	led	by	the	military	seizing	power	in	1973.	
Military	Dictatorship:		 In	1973	a	group	of	Uruguayan	generals	and	president	Juan	María	Bordaberry,	a	civilian	who	assisted	the	military	junta	against	the	government,	established	his	own	dictatorship	in	Uruguay.	Once	the	dictatorship	was	in	place	the	government	began	a	hardline	approach	against	the	rising	left	and	Tupamaros.	This	military	regime	brutally	suppressed	the	left	and	kidnapped,	tortured,	and	killed	many	of	the	leaders	of	the	left	and	the	Tupamaros.	After	capturing	Tupamaros	leaders	during	the	rebellion,	they	imprisoned	them	and	began	torturing	them	and	exacting	their	revenge.	One	of	these	leaders	was	José	Mujica,	who	was	considered	a	high	value	prisoner	and	was	never	kept	in	one	prison	for	longer	than	six	months	because	of	his	ability	to	rally	the	prisoners	and	the	importance	he	held	for	the	Tupamaros.				 José	Mujica,	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	MLN-T,	was	abducted	by	military	forces	while	roaming	the	Uruguayan	countryside	and	was	brought	into	the	military’s																																																									71	McSherry,	8	
	 		
	 27	
interrogation	facilities.	During	his	initial	capture	in	1972	he	was	tortured	in	captivity	for	information	regarding	the	Tupamaros	and	their	leadership	structure.	This	torture	included	a	particularly	awful	method	of	using	an	electric	prod	on	his	naked	body,	which	led	to	a	permanent	change	in	Mujica’s	incontinence	and	severe	mental	trauma.	Upon	receiving	what	information	they	desired	from	Mujica,	he	was	released	to	partake	in	the	negotiations	with	the	government	and	the	remaining	MLN-T	fighters.	These	negotiations,	which	were	held	in	undisclosed	locations	involving	the	surrender	of	the	Tupamaros	fighters,	and	the	government	used	former	members,	like	Mujica,	to	negotiate	with	the	fighters.72			 With	the	collapse	of	the	civilian	government	in	1973	Mujica’s	life	as	a	political	prisoner	changed.	For	the	following	twelve	years,	he	and	several	other	leaders	of	the	MLN-T	would	be	transferred	around	to	different	military	facilities.73	This	was	necessary	because	the	dictatorship	chose	different	military	facilities	so	that	they	could	keep	all	the	Tupamaros	separate.	In	these	separate	and	isolated	locations,	they	would	commit	egregious	human	rights	violations	to	them	during	their	captivity.	These	violations,	which	Mujica	lists	thoroughly,	fundamentally	broke	him	down	mentally	and	would	stay	with	Mujica	long	after	his	captivity.			 Mujica	was	held	with	a	certain	group	of	Tupamaros,	the	others	being	Eleuterio	Fernández,	and	Mauricio	Rosencof.	The	three	each	experienced	similar	conditions	during	they’re	captivity.	Mujica’s	conditions	included	not	being	allowed	to	bath	for	two	years,	water	boarding,	physical	abuse,	hallucinations	due	to	guards																																																									72	Brum,	Pablo.	The	Robin	Hood	guerrillas:	the	epic	journey	of	Uruguay's	Tupamaros.	Charleston,	SC:	CreateSpace,	2014.	298.	73	“The	Robin	Hood	Guerillas”,	335.		
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watching	him,	and	solitary	confinement.74	During	his	time	as	a	prisoner	Mujica	spent	over	4,000	days	in	these	kinds	of	living	conditions	with	no	hope	of	release	and	no	news	from	the	outside	world.75					 At	the	same	time	the	dictatorship	was	facing	a	struggle	to	maintain	its	repressive	techniques	and	control	over	the	Uruguayan	populace.	During	the	1980’s	there	was	a	resurgence	in	politicians	from	the	formerly	banned	leftist	groups	who	desired	to	bring	about	a	change	in	Uruguay.	In	response	to	the	rise	of	these	new	politicians	in	1980,	the	military	regime	under	Aparicio	Méndez	sought	to	entrench	themselves,	and	their	authoritarian	regime,	with	a	new	constitution.	This	tactic	failed	and	encouraged	the	exiled	and	repressed	political	leaders	to	seek	to	the	end	the	regime.	This	change	came	about	in	1984	through	the	Naval	Club	Pact,	which	established	the	conditions	for	the	transition	back	to	civilian	rule	and	the	end	of	12	years	of	dictatorship.76						
Restored	Democracy	and	the	integration	of	the	MLN-T		 Once	democracy	was	restored	in	1985	under	President	Julio	Sanguinetti,	the	FA	came	back	as	a	strong	coalition	and	served	as	a	sign	for	the	future	of	democracy	in	Uruguay.77	This	included	the	reintegration	of	the	MLN-T	into	political	society.	The	MLN-T	has	seen	many	of	its	leaders	in	political	office,	but	none	more	prevalent	then	José	Mujica.	Mujica	was	elected	president	in	2009,	and	was	one	of	the	most	active	Tupamaros	kidnapped	during	the	military	coup,	released	in	1985.	Upon	his	release,																																																									74	“The	Robin	Hood	Guerillas”,	334.		75	“The	Robin	Hood	Guerillas”,	1.	76	Garcé,	Adolfo	“De	guerrilleros	a	gobernantes:	El	proceso	de	adaptacio	́n	del	MLN-Tupamaros	a	la	legalidad	y	a	la	competencia	electoral	en	Uruguay	(1985-2009)”	10.	77		Luna,	Juan	Pablo.	"Frente	Amplio	and	the	Crafting	of	a	Social	Democratic	Alternative	in	Uruguay."	Latin	American	Politics	and	Society	(2008):	15.		
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he	and	the	leaders	of	the	Tupamaros	decided	to	forgo	guerilla	warfare	and	enter	politics.	Shirley	Christian,	of	the	New	York	Times,	below	illustrates	former	president	Mujica’s	description	of	the	internal	review	that	the	MLN-T	underwent	before	joining	the	FA.78		Mr.	Mujica	also	acknowledged	that	the	Tupamaros	are	going	through	an	''internal	reorganization''	that	reflects	the	varied	experiences	of	the	members	during	the	past	dozen	years	as	well	as	what	he	termed	''the	crisis	all	over	the	world	in	the	traditional	thinking	of	the	left”.79			This	moment	in	the	formation	of	the	FA	is	impressive	due	to	his	incredible	patience	to	suspend	their	push	for	the	immediate	creation	of	an	active	party	in	the	political	structure.	This	patience	allowed	the	Tupamaros	to	achieve	a	better	understanding	of	themselves	and	the	world.	The	leaders	of	the	movement	knew	that	they	had	to	first	understand	themselves	before	they	could	try	and	change	Uruguay.				 In	Christian’s	1986	New	York	Times	article	she	describes	the	influence	of	other	worldly	movements	and	how	the	leaders	of	the	MLN-T	sought	to	use	these	events	to	help	their	cause	and	solidify	their	political	party,		Some	Tupamaros,	he	said,	have	returned	from	exile	in	Western	Europe,	where	they	were	influenced	by	social	democratic	thinking.	Others	are	marked	by	the	long	years	of	prison	isolation.	Still	others,	he	said,	are	returning	to	Uruguay	from	Central	America,	where	they	were	influenced	by	the	Sandinistas	and	the	Salvadoran	guerrillas,	both	of	whom	believe	in	leadership	by	an	all-powerful	revolutionary	vanguard.80			With	different	perspectives	in	mind	the	MLN-T	formed	their	own	political	party	called	the	called	the	Movement	of	Popular	Participation	(MPP),	which	joined	the	FA																																																									78	Garcé,	12.	79	Christian,	Shirley	“Tupamaros	of	Uruguay:	The	Mystique	Survives”	The	New	York	
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in	1988	and	is	currently	the	largest	single	faction	within	the	FA.81	The	MPP	and	the	MLN-T	wanted	to	fully	endorse	the	socialist	movement	and	create	a	party	that	would	embody	what	the	Cuban	Revolution	and	other	revolutionary	movements	in	Central	America	had	fought	to	achieve.	They	didn’t	want	to	continue	the	violence	of	the	past,	but	instead	to	have	their	goals	represented	through	an	open	and	democratic	political	process.				 The	MPP	political	party	took	in	several	different	aspects	not	only	regarding	themselves,	but	also	of	the	world	around	them.	In	1995,	the	Progressive	Encounter	and	the	Nuevo	Espacio	coalitions	joined	the	FA	and	they	began	to	compete	on	the	national	stage	as	a	serious	political	movement.	In	the	2004,	national	elections	the	party	pulled	off	a	major	upset	against	the	traditional	parties	like	the	dominant	Colorado	party	(PC)	and	the	Blanco	parties	(PB).82	They	were	able	to	come	away	with	17	out	of	the	31	senate	seats,	52	out	of	the	99	in	the	chamber	of	deputies	and	won	the	presidency	behind	Tabaré	Vázquez.83				 The	results	of	this	election	helped	cement	the	FA	as	a	major	political	group.	The	FA	was	able	to	represent	the	far	left,	and	it	encompassed	both	the	poor	and	the	conservative	populations	that	sought	to	bring	back	import	industrial	substitution	(ISI)	which	endorsed	the	usage	of	foreign	made	goods	to	substitute	national	industry.84	It	was	a	broad	movement	that	helped	people	feel	that	they	were	truly																																																									81	Garcé	Adolfo	“De	guerrilleros	a	gobernantes:	El	proceso	de	adaptacio	́n	del	MLN-Tupamaros	a	la	legalidad	y	a	la	competencia	electoral	en	Uruguay	(1985-2009)”	Hal:	1-24.		82	Luna,	Juan	Pablo.	"Frente	Amplio	and	the	Crafting	of	a	Social	Democratic	Alternative	in	Uruguay."	Latin	American	Politics	and	Society	(2008):	18.	83	Luna,	21.	84	Luna,	23.	
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being	represented.	With	the	successful	presidential	election	of	Tabaré	Vázquez	and	the	FA	congressional	majority	in	2006,	the	coalition	solidified	its	presence	on	the	national	stage	and	showed	the	huge	progress	that	it	had	made	since	its	formation.	The	FA’s	success	represented	the	national	acceptance	of	a	solidified	left.	This	success	would	lead	to	the	election	of	José	Mujica	to	the	presidency.85				 The	largest	issue	that	the	MPP	and	the	FA	currently	face	is	that	the	majority	of	their	political	leaders	are	advancing	in	age	and	there	appears	to	be	no	younger	generation	of	leaders	to	fill	the	void.	Christian’s	New	York	Times	article	accurately	shows	however	that	this	is	not	the	first	time	that	these	issues	have	been	encountered,		…	Despite	the	graying	image	of	the	leadership,	more	than	half	of	the	current	Tupamaros	militants	are	less	than	25	years	old.	An	open	convention	called	by	the	Tupamaros	last	December	attracted	about	1,000	people,	thought	to	constitute	the	total	number	of	members	and	serious	sympathizers.86		The	party	has	had	problems	gaining	younger	leaders	and	the	older	leaders	like	LatinoBarómetro,	which	is	a	poll	that	gathers	the	opinion	of	citizens	throughout	Latin	America	on	issues	regarding	social	norms,	economic	issues,	and	politics.	LatinoBarómetro	provides	data	illustrating	the	success	of	the	party	over	the	recent	years	and	has	shown	that	there	has	been	a	serious	spike	in	the	popularity	of	the	party	since	its	formation.		
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LatinoBarómetro	data	supporting	the	FA:	In	2004	LatinoBarómetro	survey	posed	the	question	to	a	sample	of	Uruguayans	what	party	they	would	vote	for	if	the	election	were	this	Sunday.	The	data	that	came	back	didn’t	favor	the	political	system,	64.6%	of	the	population	felt	that	they	wouldn’t	vote	while	another	20.1%	of	the	population	felt	that	they	didn’t	even	know	whom	they	would	vote	for.	These	numbers	are	staggering	because	they	represent	a	population	that	had	lost	faith	in	the	democratic	process.	The	numbers	however	changed	drastically	and	in	the	most	recent	2013	opinion	polls	41.8%	said	that	they	would	vote	for	the	FA	candidate.	This	number	has	gone	up	since	2001	when	the	FA	and	the	Encuentro	Progresista	(EP)	claimed	34.6%	of	the	entire	population’s	vote.		 LatinoBarómetro	data	tables	regarding	Uruguay’s	democratic	transformation	from	1995	to	2013	are	interesting.	The	data	shows	an	impressive	national	swing	towards	the	left.	In	1995,	the	total	percentage	of	the	Uruguayan	population	who	claimed	to	be	leftist	was	around	.2%	of	the	total	populace	with	around	11.7%	of	the	country	claiming	to	be	right	wing.	So	the	data	is	showing	a	country	that	was	typical	for	its	time	and	a	political	system	that	favored	right	wing	and	conservative	policies.	However	in	2013	the	most	recent	LatinoBarómetro	surveys	have	shown	a	huge	swing	to	the	left.	In	2013	about	11.3%	of	the	Uruguayan	population	oriented	themselves	with	the	left	wing.	This	is	a	huge	change	in	the	national	percentage	that	considers	themselves	to	be	leftist.	This	national	switch	in	many	ways	is	a	result	of	the	Frente	Amplio	and	the	influence	of	their	political	coalition.			
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	 In	1995	the	LatinoBarómetro	polled	how	satisfied	people	were	with	democracy	in	Uruguay	and	only	.5%	of	the	population	claimed	that	they	were	very	satisfied	with	democracy	in	Uruguay.	This	poll	was	taken	again	in	2013	regarding	satisfaction	with	democracy	and	70.9%	of	the	population	now	claim	to	be	very	satisfied	with	democracy.	This	poll	is	reveals	of	the	significance	of	the	FA	because	as	the	total	amount	of	people	who	support	the	FA	has	increased	so	has	the	increased	satisfaction	with	democracy.	The	MPP	and	the	FA	have	been	influential	in	Uruguay	allowing	the	country	to	feel	that	democracy	is	being	valued	and	that	it	is	something	important	to	their	country.	The	FA	has	helped	increase	the	strength	of	democracy	in	Uruguay	and	through	these	different	statistics	the	correlation	between	the	FA	and	overall	trend	of	democratic	stability	in	Uruguay	is	clear.	The	FA	and	the	MPP	have	helped	democracy	solidify	and	they	have	helped	people	feel	that	democracy	is	possible.	 	
Conclusion:		 In	the	most	recent	publication	of	Latinobarometro’s	data	in	2015	the	idea	of	Uruguay	maintaining	a	strong	democracy	was	supported.	In	the	2015	data	tables	75.8%	of	all	of	those	polled	responded	that	democracy	was	the	best	governing	option,	with	11.1%	claiming	that	the	manner	of	governing	didn’t	concern	them.	This	data	confirms	that	democracy	is	still	an	active	part	of	Uruguayan	culture	and	the	efforts	of	the	FA	have	been	paying	off.	In	addition	to	these	data	points	reflecting	the	national	support	for	democracy	is	overall	happiness	regarding	the	actions	of	the	parliament	and	national	congress.	The	data	that	came	back	from	Uruguay	regarding	
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this	satisfaction	reflects	very	well	on	the	institutions,	with	5.6%	of	those	polled	saying	that	they	are	doing	very	well	and	57%	saying	they	have	done	a	good	job.			 In	addition	to	these	data	points	Latinobarometro	includes	the	survey	regarding	the	particular	party	that	voters	would	back	if	they	had	to	vote	this	Sunday.	In	these	polls	49.8%	of	those	polled	felt	that	they	would	vote	for	the	FA,	the	closest	group	to	the	FA	was	the	PN	(Partido	Nacional)	with	7.8%.	In	additional	polling	Latinobarometro	asked	voters	how	strongly	they	support	this	party	and	35%	answered	strongly	while	50.5%	answered	quite	strongly.	The	Uruguayan	political	landscape	has	changed	dramatically	since	the	1970’s	dictatorship	and,	based	on	the	efforts	of	the	FA	and	the	Tupamaros,	the	revolutionary	ideals	that	the	movement	cherished	have	flourished	and	developed	into	a	strong	democracy.										 Uruguay	is	currently	one	of	the	most	stable	democracies	in	all	of	Latin	America.	This	is	in	large	part	because	of	the	contributions	and	hard	work	of	the	Tupamaros	for	democracy.	The	Tupamaros	began	as	a	movement	that	tried	to	fill	the	holes	that	democracy	was	unable	to	fill.	They	then	became	part	of	the	government	as	a	formal	political	party	and	ceased	their	guerilla	activities.	For	these	reasons,	I	think	it	is	fair	to	say	that	they	were	an	informal	organization,	that	became	an	informal	party	and	finally	became	an	official	movement.	This	transition	from	informal	to	a	formal	movement	through	the	formation	of	the	MPP	and	the	FA	is	a	testament	to	the	desire	of	the	Tupamaros	to	strengthen	democracy	in	Uruguay.			
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Chapter	Three:	The	FARC,	UP,	and	Colombia		
History of the FARC:  	 In	order	to	understand	the	formation	of	the	FARC,	or	Las	Fuerzas	Armadas	Revolucionarios	de	Colombia	it	is	necessary	to	explain	the	impact	of	an	event	called	
la	violencia.	La	violencia	was	a	nine	year	period,	between	1948-1957,	where	state	violence	was	`waged	between	the	liberal	and	conservative	parties	within	Colombia,	which	resulted	in	a	high	amount	of	civilian	deaths.	La	violencia	began	with	the	assassination	of	the	liberal	political	leader	Jorge	Eliécer	Gaitán	in	1948,	which	many	liberal	leaders	credited	to	the	conservative	party.	Gaitán,	who	was	meant	to	be	the	liberal’s	presidential	candidate,	led	the	way	for	the	conservative,	Laureano	Gómez	to	win	the	next	presidential	race	in	the	1950.87	
	 Gómez’s	victory,	and	the	continued	control	of	the	conservative	party	in	the	countryside,	greatly	contributed	to	the	formation	of	liberal	guerilla	squads,	which	were	organized	to	combat	conservative	party’s	control	in	rural	villages	and	farms.	Gómez	would	lose	the	faith	of	both	the	conservative	party	and	the	military,	and	was	deposed	by	a	military	coup	d’état,	which	led	General	Gustavo	Rojas	Pinilla	to	presidency	in	1953.	During	Pinilla’s	presidency,	he	sought	to	end	the	political	insurgency	throughout	the	countryside	by	adopting	a	hardline	approach	using	violent	suppression	methods.	Pinilla	remained	in	power	until	1957,	at	which	time	the	liberal	and	conservative	parties	united	to	form	the	National	Front.	The	National	Front	reached	an	agreement	that	they	would	alternate	who	would	win	the																																																									87	Offstein,	Norman.	"An	Historical	Review	and	Analysis	of	Colombian	Guerrilla	Movements:	FARC,	ELN	and	EPL	."	Desarrollo	y	Sociedad,	September	2003,	101.	
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presidency	lasting	until	1974.	This	agreement	began	with	the	election	of	the	liberal	Alberto	Camargo	to	the	presidency	in	1958.88	
	 Under	the	leadership	of	Camargo,	the	Colombian	government	sought	to	combat	the	damage	that	la	violencia	had	brought	to	the	Colombian	people.	By	the	time	that	Camargo	had	come	to	power	approximately	200,000	people	had	died	during	the	nine	year	period	of	the	violence.	Carmargo	sought	to	end	la	violencia	by	putting	different	policies	into	place	that	would	lift	the	rural	communities	out	of	poverty.	These	policies,	included	plans	to	redistribute	lands	to	small	planters,	construct	schools,	health	clinics,	water	and	sewage	systems,	roads,	and	community	centers.	The	program	faced	many	problems,	which	included	a	lack	of	funds	and	a	slow	pace	of	land	redistribution,	that	greatly	affected	their	effectiveness	in	the	countryside.	The	reforms	also	couldn’t	address	the	high	rates	of	urban	unemployment	and	the	lack	of	low	income	housing	in	urban	areas,	which	created	tension	throughout	the	country.89		
	 This	tension	unified	the	dissenting	liberal	guerilla	groups,	that	had	previously	remained	in	isolated	and	separate	jungle	pockets	during	the	1950’s.	These	guerilla	groups,	which	would	eventually	form	the	FARC	movement,	began	as	the	Southern	Guerilla	Bloc.	The	Southern	Guerilla	Bloc,	which	developed	throughout	southern	federal	administrative	sections,	developed	a	strong	relationship	with	the	Colombian	Communist	Party	(CCP).	This	relationship	was	extremely	beneficial	for	the	Southern	Guerilla	Bloc,	who	received	financial	support	from	the	party	as	well	as																																																										88	Offstein,	101-102.	89	Offstein,	103.	
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political	direction	for	the	movement.	The	connection	the	CCP	and	the	support	the	party	had	from	Russia,	gave	the	Southern	Guerilla	Bloc	much	needed	resources	and	confidence	to	emerge	as	a	national	guerilla	movement.	With	the	formation	of	the	Fuerzas	Armadas	Revolucionarios	de	Colombia	(FARC)	in	1964,	Moscow	released	a	statement	regarding	U.S.	imperialism	and	how	the	U.S.	had	military	bases	in	Colombia	calling	for	workers	and	peasants	to	support	the	guerillas.90		
	Development	of	the	FARC:	
The	U.S.	and	Colombia,	during	the	rise	of	the	FARC,	had	good	inter-governmental	relations,	and	Colombia	was	one	of	the	U.S.’s	strongest	allies	in	the	region.	During	the	Cold	War	Colombia	had	openly	supported	U.S.	anticommunism,	and	President	George	W.	Bush	stated	that	Colombia	was	the	U.S.’s	strongest	ally	in	Latin	America.	Colombia	had	sent	soldiers	to	Korea	during	the	Korean	war	in	the	1950’s	and	motioned	to	expel	Cuba	from	the	OAS	at	the	1961	conference	following	the	Cuban	Revolution	in	1959.	Additionally,	and	most	relevant	to	combating	the	FARC	and	other	insurgency	groups	within	the	country,	during	the	1960’s	Colombia	adopted	the	national	security	doctrine	promoted	by	the	United	States.	The	Colombian	government	had	agreed	upon	an	intelligence	sharing	plan,	which	allowed	the	U.S.	to	place	military	officials	in	the	Bogota	embassy	as	advisors	to	the	government.91	With	Colombia’s	close,	and	supportive	relations	to	the	U.S.	in	mind,	the	formation	of	the	FARC,	a	communist	group	that	had	the	support	of	the	CCP	with																																																									90	Offstein,	103.	91	Nieto,	Jaime	Zuluaga.	"U.S.	Security	Policies	and	United	States–Colombia	Relations."	Latin	American	Perspectives	34,	no.	1	(2007):	116.	
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support	from	the	Soviet	Union,	represented	a	grave	threat	to	the	U.S.	and	the	Colombia	government.		
The	FARC	formally	created	their	name	in	1966,	declaring	their	status	as	a	communist	armed	guerilla	movement	within	Colombia,	which	triggered	the	U.S.	fears	of	the	spread	of	communism	within	Latin	America.	The	beginning	of	the	U.S.	intervention	against	the	FARC	was	through	Plan	Laso,	which	was	a	U.S.	led	counterinsurgency	effort	that	overlapped	with	Colombian	efforts	to	combat	guerillas.	The	implementation	of	these	policies	were	quite	severe	on	the	FARC,	with	the	movement	seeing	a	loss	of	70	percent	of	its	armaments	and	a	significant	amount	of	their	soldiers	between	1966	and	1968.	Even	with	these	efforts	however	the	FARC	would	survive	and	grow	to	1,000	soldiers	by	1978.92	Although	the	FARC’s	forces	grew	during	this	period,	they	had	been	pushed	deep	into	the	jungle	regions	of	Guaviara,	Caquetá,	and	Putumayo.	These	regions	would	eventually	serve	as	the	basis	for	the	development	of	their	economic	role	in	narcotrafficking.93		
The	1980’s	represented	a	bright	future	for	the	FARC	and	for	their	development.	With	the	success	of	the	Sandinista	Revolution	in	Nicaragua,	the	FARC,	as	well	as	other	guerilla	movements	throughout	Latin	America,	felt	empowered.	This	empowerment	for	the	FARC	represented	the	development	of	a	different	approach,	that	would	venture	away	from	the	Cuban	hit	and	run	style,	into	a	more	direct	and	frontal	assault	style.	This	represented	the	development	of	48	different																																																									92	Rochlin,	Jim.	"Plan	Colombia	and	the	revolution	in	military	affairs:	the	demise	of	the	FARC."	Review	of	International	Studies	37,	no.	02	(2010):	720.	93	Rochlin,	720.	
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military	fronts,	with	an	increased	presence	in	urban	areas,	and	improved	communication	amongst	the	guerillas.	These	developments	would	greatly	assist	the	FARC	in	opening	negotiations	with	the	Colombian	government	to	further	advance	their	cause,	not	as	guerillas	but	as	a	political	movement.94	
The UP: 
 In 1985, the Colombian government signed an agreement to “ensure 
political security and equality for the UP (Union Patriotica)”95 This was an empty 
promise, however, as the government eventually did not honor this agreement. 
Several different non-governmental organizations, with encouragement from the 
government, were the major perpetrators responsible for subsequent deaths of 
members of the UP. The paramilitaries, drug lords, and the Colombian army all 
lined up against the UP and their officials for different reasons. The issue came to 
a head when in 1987 a young fourteen year old boy, who was directly related to a 
Medellin drug cartel, assassinated Jaime Pardo, the 1986 UP presidential 
candidate and party figure head, leading to the FARC abandoning the UP and 
returning to Guerilla warfare.96  
 The official death count of members of the UP is around 3,000 but many 
believe that number to be closer to 5,000. The UP represented an opportunity for 
the federal government to put aside their grievances with the guerillas and allow 
them to reintegrate into normal life. The government however didn’t want to 																																																								94	Rochlin,	720-721.	95	Gomez-Suarez,	Andrei.	"Perpetrator	Blocs,	Genocidal	Mentalities	and	Geographies:	The	Destruction	of	the	Union	Patriotica	in	Colombia	and	Its	Lessons	for	Genocide	Studies."	Journal	of	Genocide	Research:	639.	Print.	96	Gomez,	640.	
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provide the FARC or other guerilla movements the opportunity to seek political 
representation for fear of losing control over political landscape. The Álvaro 
Uribe administration then deemed it necessary to exterminate the UP because 
they were acting as a cover for the FARC to solidify their position in Colombia.  
The violence levied against the UP and their supporters was so drastic that in 
1987 the FARC saw themselves forced to renounce the UP party returning to 
armed struggle against the Colombian government.97  
 The UP was going to represent the left in the country during the late 
1980’s election cycles. In 1986, they won 350 local council seats, 23 deputy 
positions in different assemblies, 9 congressional seats, 6 senators seats, and 
4.6% of the presidential vote.98 These results were greater than any other leftist 
party in Colombia, and more than any other third party in its history. The UP 
wanted to represent the hopes of the people and the needs of the poor. These 
desires were also synonymous with those of the FARC, which was why it was so 
fitting that the FARC co-founded the organization. The UP’s goals were to fight 
for land redistribution, better health care, educational improvements for the 
poor, and the nationalization of businesses, banks and transportation99. These 
desires to represent the people however were never offered to the UP as the Uribe 
administration never followed through on its promises to help protect the party’s 
leaders from governmental sponsored paramilitary groups.100     
 																																																								97	Gomez,	643.	98	Freeman,	E.,	Daniel,	“Patriotic	Union”	Colombian	Reports,	January	13,	2014		99	Ibid	100	Ibid	
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Key LatinoBarómetro Data for Colombian Democracy: 
 Democracy in Colombia has been severally affected by the actions of the 
federal government against the FARC and the UP. The lack of democratic 
legitimacy within the Colombian government as well as the lack of variety in 
politcal parties is due in most part to state sponsored violence committed against 
the UP. The current state of democracy in Colombia is in shambles. The 
Colombian general populace has generally lost faith in the system, and the 
following LatinoBarómetro data helps prove this claim. 
 In a 2013 poll 34.5% of the populace surveyed said that they wouldn’t vote 
while another 6.4% said that they would submit blank ballots. In addition to this 
data the overall satisfaction with democracy in 2013 was staggeringly low. In the 
LatinoBarómetro poll of satisfaction only 4.1% of those polled responded as 
saying that they are happy with the state of democracy. Currently some 49.35% of 
those polled they are not very satisfied with the democratic institution in place. 
Additionally, only around some 1.5% of the population believe that there is a 
democratic process in place with some 48.6% saying that the government is 
currently a democracy but that it has major problems. Another interesting piece 
of data that LatinoBarómetro provides regarding current beliefs about democracy 
in Colombia are the polls endorsing a one party system. In the 2013 polls for 
Colombia of those interviewed who don’t feel that the one party system is the 
most effective approach to governance. Only 25.1% agree or strongly agree with 
the idea of a one party system while the other 74.9% of those polled believe that 
there should be a multiple party system in place.    
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 These two data sets support the case for the inclusion of the FARC in the 
political structure go back to 1985. The people of Colombia clearly feel that the 
democratic system is not working and that the parties that are in place aren’t 
representing their needs as a society. The FARC, in their recent round of 
negotiations with the Colombian state have asked for something similar to 
Uruguay, when the Tupamaros became a political party. In their negotiations 
with the Colombian government they sought to bring about a self-critique to try 
and reform the state model. In 2013, Colombia Reports published a piece in 2013 
regarding the response of one of the leaders of the FARC to a political controversy 
regarding corruption in the armed forces. The current leader, Timoleon Jiménez, 
directly addressed the letter to the current Colombian president Juan Manuel 
Santos saying the following,  
Se puede leer en las noticias. El modelo de imposiciones e 
intolerancias se ha agotado. La democracia colombiana, por encima 
de los discursos, es una vergüenza, Santos. Vamos a cambiarla.101  
 
Roughly translated Jiménez is saying that one can see in the news that the 
government is exhausted and that it is shame. I think that the idea of a complete 
reform of the government is a valid one. When examining the effect of the 
organizational review that the Tupamaros underwent, and their subsequent 
success, this review could be of use for Colombia. The commitment to an internal 
review would lead to very positive democratic results in Colombia and possibly 
resolve the issues currently facing democracy within the country.    
 
																																																								101	"Timochenko	le	envió	carta	al	presidente	Santos	rechazando	la	democracia	colombiana”	Colombiano	July	9th,	2013	
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Colombia’s Conflict and Peace Process: 
 The war between the FARC and the government has claimed around 
220,000 lives and 6.7 million people have been labeled as victims of the war 
between the government, paramilitaries, and the guerillas.102 The reform of the 
UP and the ongoing peace negotiations between the government and the FARC 
are reassuring for the future. The negotiations began in 2013 and a the 
LatinoBarómetro survey regarding people’s belief’s for democracy in ten years 
showed a remarkable increase as previously described.  
 The general sense of all those in Colombia is that the future for the country 
still lies with democratization. This claim is supported by a LatinoBarómetro 
survey where 52.3% of Colombian’s believe that democracy is the preferable 
system of governance. In this poll, only 12.7% said that they would prefer an 
authoritative form of governance to democracy. LatinoBarómetro also has 
surveys that show that the people believe that the future for democracy is bright. 
The current polls reflecting the scale of democratization of Colombia show that 
only 10.1% of Colombians feel that the government is completely democratic. 
LatinoBarómetro also takes polls for where the people think that democracy is 
going to be in ten years from now and the results from the 2013 survey were 
interesting. Some 63.4% of those polled believe that in 10 years the state will be 
completely democratic with only 1.4% believing that the state will be 
undemocratic. This data is encouraging as recent news described the UP party as 
attempting to return to the political arena in Colombia. They also refuse to call 
																																																								102	Aldwinckle,	Jack,	“How	Colombia	plans	to	turn	32,000	ex-jungle-dwelling	guerrillas	into	useful	members	of	society”	Quartz,	May	31,	2015		
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themselves communists or Marxists but seek to gain the trust of millions of 
impoverished people on the fringes of the country.103   
 The relationship that has developed between the FARC and the political 
institutions of the Colombia government is extensive historically speaking. With 
these negotiations underway, the process trying to stabilize Colombia can begin. 
As such it is important to note that the FARC, through the UP, began as an 
organization that sought political change through peaceful means. The 
government used this to its advantage and invited them into the political process, 
just to slaughter their candidates. This politicide was a negative turning point 
that led to genocide. Colombia is now ready to move on past this period of 
violence to reform their political process. The current negotiations between the 
FARC and the Santos government are healthy and should lead to a positive 
change in the overall democratic transition of Colombian politics.              
  The current negotiations currently with the FARC are still progressing and 
are promising. They have reached several stalling points but they are seeking to 
try and reach a point where the two can agree on issues as wide and varying as 
land reform, governmental reform, drug trafficking, etc.104 The war that has been 
waged between the government and the FARC is one that needs to end in order 
for democracy to flourish in Colombia. If the two sides can reach an agreement 
like that of the MLN-T and the Uruguayan government then the outcome would 
be very productive for both sides. 
 																																																								103	Freeman,	E.,	Daniel,	“Patriotic	Union”	Colombian	Reports,	January	13,	2014	104		Neuman,	William“Killing	of	10	soldiers	deals	a	setback	to	the	Colombian	peace	talks	with	the	FARC	rebels”	The	New	York	Times,	April	15,	2015	
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Conclusion: 
The UP party that the FARC co-sponsored is now fighting for it’s very 
survival. How can we justify or explain this outcome for each guerilla movement? 
In Racheal Rudolph’s From Terrorism to Politics, she says  
These murders radicalized FARC, which felt legitimized in its 
actions: FARC officially interpreted the UP’s extermination as a 
sign of the government’s intolerance and of the impossibility of 
legal political action in Colombia. A serious chance, such as that 
witnessed in Lebanon and Northern Ireland, was therefore lost.105       
 
The FARC began, as an organization that sought democratic reconciliation 
through a political participation in Colombia but the Uribe organization didn’t 
accept that they were an honest player. The previous quote is particularly 
interesting because it reveals the frustration of not being able to reach a peaceful 
agreement as what occurred in Ireland with the IRA and in Lebanon with 
Hezbollah.106  While the other examples here, in both Lebanon and Ireland had 
didn’t partake in the narcotrafficking, the political frustrations regarding 
representation are similar.  
The resulting ceasefire merely forced the FARC to prolong its battle 
against the government and becoming even more violent. In the 
LatinoBarómetro surveys the percentage of people who say that guerilla 
movements are a crucial issue, these polls are very high but they have gone down 
significantly over the last decade. From 2001-2003 for example the number of 																																																								105	Engeland, Anisseh Van, and Rachael M. Rudolph. "Failed Attempts: The 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia (FARC) and the Union Patriotica 
(UP)." In From Terrorism to Politics. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008.	106	Ibid	
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people that said the guerillas and their armed insurrection were the major issues 
facing the country was high 40.5%. Whereas in 2008 that number dropped 
significantly to 16.6% and in 2013 it was down to 12.4%.  
 The violence experienced in the aftermath of the failed integration of the 
FARC-UP coalition was extensive and devastating. As was previously mentioned 
Colombia is a country where political development is in a state of disarray and 
one of the major issues that they are contending with is guerilla and paramilitary 
violence. If one relies on the surveys taken by third parties, like LatinoBarómetro, 
using methods described by Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbel Pérez 
Liñán then several key aspects are going to be missing. In their own words they 
define democracy as,		
We define a democracy as a regime (a) that sponsors free and fair 
competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (b) that 
allows for inclusive adult citizenship; (c) that protects civil liberties 
and political rights; and (d) in which the elected governments really 
govern and the military is under civilian control.107 
 
These categories are useful when examining countries with established and 
secure democracies, but when evaluating a situation like Colombia they are not 
adequate. This is not to say that democracy is non-existent in Colombia, but 
rather that there are discrepancies within the strength of democracy being high. 
The system is in disarray because democratic values do not extend past the major 
cities where the federal government can oversee the democratic process. The 
government of Colombia must seek to extend the parameters of democracy past 																																																								107	Munck,	Gerardo	L.,	ed.	Regimes	and	Democracy	in	Latin	America:	Theories	and	Methods.	Oxford,	GBR:	Oxford	University	Press,	UK,	2007.	ProQuest	ebrary.	Web.	9	June	2015.		
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the major metropolises and into the countryside. The issue that has violently 
erupted looks to develop democracy, involves the war that the government and 
the FARC are waging that puts all citizens in serious danger.  
 The issue of controlling the FARC, Colombian government, and 
paramilitary violence through the ongoing war that the government is waging is 
of the utmost importance to spread democratization across Colombia. In order to 
try and negotiate with the FARC, the Santos administration is having to deal with 
the outcome of forcing more guerilla warfare. They are effectively demobilizing 
an army, and trying to reintegrate them back into society. The current 
negotiations are hitting several reported “road-blocks” including narcotrafficking, 
land-redistribution, and political representation or a political change of some 
kind. These negotiations are crucial for the advancement of democracy in 
Colombia and will allow for the country to constructively on raising the quality of 
institutions while maximizing the effectiveness of the participatory process.  
 If Colombia had allowed the FARC to take an active role in the democratic 
structure of the country, then the shape of democracy today might be completely 
different. The exclusiveness of the Colombian political system is one of the major 
reasons for the continued violence within the nation. If the political system was 
allowed to be open, like that of Uruguay, then the FARC would not need to 
continue guerilla warfare. The most significant aspect related to this is that the 
negotiations between the government and the FARC haven’t broken down yet 
and the peace progress is continuing. The inclusion of the FARC and other 
movements is crucial to developing a healthy democracy. 	
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Chapter	Four:	El	Salvador’s	FMLN	
History	of	the	FMLN:	
	 The	formation	of	the	Farabundo	Martí	National	Liberation	Front	(FMLN),	which	was	formally	announced	on	October	10th,	1980,	was	the	result	of	a	long	process	of	negotiations	that	were	held	in	Cuba	between	different	leftist	groups	from	El	Salvador.	The	five	groups,	which	included	the	Fuerzas	Populares	de	Liberación	Farabundo	Martí	(FPL),	The	People’s	Revolutionary	Army	(ERP),	The	Resistencia	Nacional	(RN),	The	Partido	Comunista	Salvadoreño	(PCS),	and	the	Partido	Revolucionario	de	los	Trbajadores	Centroamericanos	(PRTC).108	The	negotiations	held	in	Cuba	tried	to	sort	out	the	political	differences	these	groups	attempted	to	iron	throughout	the	1970’s	during	their	development.	The	political	differences,	which	included	conflicts	over	guerilla	strategies	as	well	as	competing	political	interests,	the	most	important	involving	peasant	support	in	El	Salvador,	had	to	be	resolved	before	the	FMLN	could	be	formed	into	a	viable	political	party.109		
	 The	guerilla	movement	in	El	Salvador	began	in	the	1970’s	as	an	offshoot	of	the	Communist	part.	During	this	it	was	divided	over	the	issue	of	what	approach	would	reap	the	most	success;	1)	armed	insurgency	or	2)	engage	El	Salvador’s	political	system.	The	dissenting	voices	within	the	movement	however	sought	to	enter	negotiations	following	the	Sandinistas	defeat	of	the	Anastacio	Somoza																																																									108	MacClintock,	Cynthia.	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America:	El	Salvador's	
FMLN	Peru's	Shining	Path.	Washington	(D.C.):	United	States	Institute	of	Peace	Press,	1998.	68.	109	Oñate,	Andrea.	"	The	Red	Affair:	FMLN–Cuban	relations	during	the	Salvadoran	Civil	War,	1981	–	92."	Cold	War	History	11,	no.	2	(April	15,	2011):	137.		
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dictatorship	in	Nicaragua.	The	strength	of	the	Sandinistas	came	through	the	unification	of	various	dissenting	guerilla	movements	into	one	organized	front	against	the	Somoza	dictatorship.110	The	triumph	of	Sandinistas	in	Nicaragua	inspired	a	great	deal	of	fear	within	the	government	of	El	Salvador,	and	encouraged	them	to	fully	endorse	a	violent	policy	to	destroy	political	resistance.111	
	 The	violence	that	the	guerilla	groups	endured	led	to	the	FMLN	conference	held	in	Havana,	Cuba,	for	an	accord	amongst	the	larger	guerilla	groups	fighting	in	El	Salvador.	The	accomplishment	of	these	negotiations	allowed	the	FMLN	to	release	a	statement	regarding	the	objectives	of	the	movement	and	what	they	were	fighting	for.	The	FMLN	and	their	leaders	were	fighting	against	the	government	to	create	a	social	democracy	in	El	Salvador	and	to	contest	the	authoritarian	regime.112	Joaquín	Villalobos,	one	of	the	main	leaders	of	the	FMLN,	explains	their	position,		
The	FMLN	is	struggling	for	a	government	of	full	participation,	with	representation	from	all	the	democratic	political	forces,	including	of	course	the	FMLN-FDR….	The	FMLN	maintains	that	a	government	of	full	participation	should	guarantee	freedom	of	expression	and	organization,	respect	for	Human	Rights,	and	truly	free	elections	with	participation	by	all	parties	and	forces113.	The	FMLN	merely	sought	democratic	stability	and	a	government	that	reflected	the	demands	of	the	people.	The	government	however	felt	that	the	group	was	seeking	to	enforce	a	Marxist-Leninist	ideology	for	the	nation.	
	 With	this	in	mind,	the	FMLN	leadership	sought	to	persuade	the	El	Salvadoran																																																									110	Oñate,	“The	Red	Affair”	138.	111	Oñate,	138.	112	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	56.		113	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	58.	
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middle	class	that	the	group	was	not	seeking	to	create	a	socialist	state	in	El	Salvador,	but	only	sought	to	change	the	political	reality	of	the	country.	Another	leader	of	the	FMLN,	Cayetano	Carpio,	who	was	leader	of	the	FPL	until	1983,	was	perceived	to	be	one	of	the	movements	most	profound	Marxists-Leninists,	who	described	the	group’s	efforts,		
The	revolutionary	government…	will	not	be	socialist….	The	revolutionary	democratic	government	will	support	all	private	businessmen,	the	small	industrialists	and	merchants,	and	all	of	those	who	promote	the	development	of	the	country	and	the	application	of	a	revolutionary	democratic	program.114			The	FMLN	wanted	to	overhaul	the	government	and	follow	in	the	footsteps	of	the	Cuban	Revolution.	This	effort,	which	had	the	prime	opportunity	to	realize	the	ambitions	of	leading	the	country	from	a	revolutionary	platform	failed	to	capitalize	on	the	moment	due	to	the	continuation	of	infighting	within	the	FMLN	after	the	negotiations	ended.	
	 This	failure	to	grasp	the	opportunity	of	a	weakened	government	materialized	through	the	poorly	organized	“Final	Offensive”	in	1981,	which	was	meant	to	be	a	broad	sweeping	movement	against	the	national	military.	The	FMLN	proposed	plan	was	a	multi-faceted	assault	on	two-thirds	of	El	Salvador’s	military	garrisons.	The	timing	was	ideal	for	the	group	because	General	Carlos	Romero	was	in	a	very	unstable	political	position	and	lacked	the	support	of	wealthy	local	elites	and	the	U.S.	The	eventual	failure	of	the	“Final	Offensive”	was	due	to	dissent	amongst	the	five	groups	that	made	up	the	FMLN	coalition,	specifically	the	RN	and	ERP,	who	refused	
																																																								114	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	57.	
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to	commit	to	the	action.115	The	failure	of	the	“Final	Offensive”	would	setback	the	FMLN	a	decade	before	they	saw	their	efforts	materialize	into	political	representation.	Efforts	to	end	authoritarianism	became	much	more	complicated	following	the	election	of	Ronald	Reagan	in	1980	and	the	renewed	commitment	to	anti-communist	intervention	as	a	policy	in	Central	America.		
U.S.	Involvement	in	El	Salvador:					
	 Throughout	Latin	America,	especially	during	the	20th	century,	the	influence	of	the	U.S.	government	can	unmistakably	be	seen.	El	Salvador	was	no	exception	as	increased	support	to	the	military	regime	was	synonymous	with	the	rise	of	the	FMLN	in	El	Salvador.	These	interactions	were	most	noticeable	in	the	realm	of	financial	and	military	assistance	by	the	U.S.	government.	In	1979,	the	U.S.	gave	El	Salvador	11	million	dollars	of	financial	support,	by	1980	this	jumped	to	64	million	dollars.	From	1980	onwards	the	amount	of	financial	support	that	the	U.S.	provided	to	El	Salvador	continued	to	rise,	and	in	1987	the	total	rose	to	574	millions	dollars	worth	of	support.	The	increased	assistance	can	be	placed	in	perspective	by	examining	the	percentage	of	support	El	Salvador	received,	in	comparison	with	other	Latin	American	nations.	As	was	previously	noted	the	U.S.	hit	its	aid	peak	in	1987,	at	574	million	dollars,	this	level	of	support	represented	30%	of	the	total	U.S.	aid	to	Latin	America,	which	is	impressive	seeing	as	El	Salvador	only	has	5	million	citizens.116		
	 The	type	of	aid	that	the	U.S.	provided	is	important	to	understand	when	
																																																								115	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	57.		116	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	221-222.	
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examining	the	FMLN	as	the	majority	of	the	aid	was	used	to	develop	the	El	Salvadoran	military.	From	1980	to	1989	the	U.S.	provided	El	Salvador	around	$1	billion	in	financial	support	for	their	military.	Specifically,	in	1984,	the	highest	year	of	aid	during	this	period,	the	U.S.	provided	194	million	dollars	for	military	support,	representing	more	than	half	of	the	U.S.	total	military	aid	in	Latin	America.	This	information	is	relevant	because,	when	examining	the	size	of	the	armed	forces	in	comparison	to	the	FMLN,	in	1979	the	ratio	was	1.5	military	officials	to	every	guerilla	fighter.	This	ratio	would	rise	by	the	end	of	the	1980’s	to	a	ratio	of	8	soldiers	to	1	guerilla.117		
	 This	military	aid	was	designed	to	help	the	regime	in	its	efforts	to	end	the	FMLN	and	their	terrorist	activities	throughout	El	Salvador.	The	aid	provided	the	U.S.	an	opportunity	to	apply	pressure	to	the	El	Salvadoran	government	regarding	their	elections	system	and	human	rights	violations.	The	U.S.,	while	being	afraid	of	the	rise	of	the	communism	throughout	Latin	America,	were	also	concerned	about	the	use	of	their	aid	for	the	support	of	death	squads.	The	U.S.	became	heavily	involved	in	El	Salvadoran	politics,	making	it	very	clear	to	government	officials	that	should	human	rights	violations	continue	to	occur	U.S.	aid	would	dramatically	decline.	This	realization	motivated	the	government	to	support	candidates	that	the	U.S.	backed	as	a	positive	example	of	U.S.	aid	to	El	Salvador.118		
The	U.S.	believed	the	success	of	the	elections	in	El	Salvador,	in	1982,	was	a	positive	sign	that	the	country	was	moving	towards	a	superficial	democratic	process																																																									117	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	228-229.		118	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	225.	
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and	that	the	FMLN	lacked	popular	support	against	the	government.	Even	with	this	attempted	transition	to	the	Presidency	of	Álvaro	Magaña,	human	rights	violations	persisted	and	the	FMLN	continued	to	grow	in	strength.	As	continuing	political	strife	led	to	the	U.S.	Congress	to	severally	curtail	the	military	aid	that	President	Reagan	provided	to	El	Salvador.	In	the	election	of	1984,	President	Reagan	and	Vice	President	George	H.W.	Bush	made	it	apparent	to	El	Salvadoran	politicians	that	human	rights	and	democratization	had	to	improve	for	the	U.S.	to	continue	to	provide	resources	to	combat	the	FMLN.	The	1984	election	marked	a	great	success	as	the	election	was	perceived	as	successful	and	clean,	and	José	Duarte,	who	was	the	U.S.’s	favorite	candidate,	won	the	election.119		
Duarte’s	administration	however	faced	great	difficulties	in	combating	the	FMLN,	while	attempting	to	spread	democratic	ideals	to	the	El	Salvadoran	people.	Moreover,	people	desired	social	reforms,	but	Duarte’s	U.S.	backed	free	market	policies	made	the	development	of	effective	social	reforms	extremely	difficult.	Duarte,	who	won	as	a	candidate	for	the	Christian	Democratic	Party,	received	1-3	million	dollars	in	covert	funds	from	the	CIA	in	1984.120	The	equivalent	per	capita	to	50-100	million	for	a	U.S.	election	and	lost	the	respect	from	the	El	Salvadoran	people.	In	the	elections	of	1989,	Duarte	and	the	Christian	Democratic	Party	lost	the	presidency	to	ARENA	(Alianza	Republicana	Nacionalista).	With	the	victory	of	ARENA’s	Alfredo	Cristiani,	and	of	George	H.W.	Bush	in	1989,	policy	regarding	the	FMLN	dramatically	changed	as	political	violence	increased.	Throughout	El	Salvador																																																									119	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	225-227.	120	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	226.	
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changes	in	this	strategy	reflected	a	desire	by	both	the	U.S.	and	El	Salvador	to	seek	a	negotiated	settlement	with	the	FMLN	rather	than	use	military	force	to	defeat	the	guerillas.121	
The	Peace	Process	and	Integration	of	the	FMLN:				 The	war	between	the	FMLN	and	the	government	came	to	a	head	in	1989	when	the	guerillas	launched	a	final	offensive	against	the	U.S.	backed	military	regime.	After	a	failed	series	of	negotiations	with	the	recently	President-elect	Alfredo	Cristiani	following	a	death	squad	attack	on	the	Federación	Nacional	Sindical	de	Trabajadores,	the	largest	labor	trade	federation	in	El	Salvador,	the	FMLN	reverted	to	a	full	on	assault.	This	approach,	was	swift	with	a	series	of	conflicts	between	the	guerillas	and	government’s	forces,	which	only	served	to	show	that	the	government	wasn’t	capable	of	defeating	the	guerillas	in	combat.	This	level	of	political	violence,	which	the	conflict	had	generated,	led	to	an	international	intervention,	where	the	U.N.	Security	Council	and	President	George	H.W.	Bush’s	administration	called	for	peace	between	the	guerillas	and	the	government.122			The	FMLN	offensive	launched	during	that	year	would	effectively	halt	the	counterterrorism	efforts	of	the	government.	With	the	support	of	the	international	community	and	the	impressive	manner	with	which	the	FMLN	had	combatted	the	government	gave	them	a	serious	advantage	during	peace	negotiations	in	1990.	The	conditions	for	peace	the	FMLN	presented	to	the	government	involved	reforming	the	security	sector,	ending	impunity,	and	major	political	reforms.	While	the	negotiations																																																									121	MacClintock,	Revolutionary	movements	in	Latin	America,	226-227.	122	Chávez,	Joaquín	M.	"How	Did	the	Civil	War	in	El	Salvador	End?"	American	
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failed	to	provide	extensive	military	reforms,	the	amnesty	reforms	they	won	were	later	overturned	by	ARENA	in	1993.	The	FMLN	however	did	get	many	of	the	political	reforms	they	had	sought.	On	January	16th	1992	the	FMLN	and	President	Cristiani	signed	a	peace	accord	at	Chapultepec	Castle	in	Mexico	City.123	The	outcome	of	these	negotiations	was	that	the	FMLN	went	from	being	a	potent	armed	political	movement	to	a	major	political	actor	in	the	new	El	Salvadoran	neoliberal	democracy.	This	peace	process	was	made	difficult	as	both	the	FMLN	and	the	government	violated	the	agreed	upon	peace	accords.	The	FMLN,	which	agreed	to	hand	in	all	their	weapons,	remained	armed	by	storing	caches	of	weapons	in	Nicaragua,	Guatemala,	and	Honduras.	Most	notably,	in	Nicaragua	one	exploded	prompting	the	surrendering	of	several	caches	in	different	countries.	Like	the	FMLN,	the	Cristiani	government	also	struggled	to	comply	with	the	agreements	of	the	peace	accords.	The	failure	of	the	peace	process	took	the	form	of	state	agents	and	right	wing	extremists	engaging	in	the	assassinations	of	FMLN	leaders	and	social	activists	at	the	same	time	maintaining	paramilitary	death	squads	by	merely	changing	their	names.124			After	settling	the	peace	accord	violations,	the	FMLN	finally	demobilized	its	guerilla	force	and	formally	entered	into	El	Salvador’s	political	process.	With	this	in	mind	the,	FMLN	sought	to	have	a	political	apparatus	in	place	to	support	the	party’s	participation	in	the	presidential,	municipal,	and	parliamentary	elections	of	1994.	In	order	for	the	movement	to	be	able	to	achieve	this	level	of	political	sophistication	they	trained	their	members	in	activities	related	to	political	activism	and	electoral																																																									123	Chávez,	1792-93.		124	Chávez,	1794.		
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politics.	With	this	transition	came	new	difficulties,	in	1994	when	the	FMLN	formally	dissolved	the	five	different	parties	making	up	the	guerilla	coalition	all	differed	in	the	political	direction	with	the	FMLN	movement.	These	differences	initially	took	the	form	of	the	PD,	which	was	made	up	of	the	RN	and	the	ERP,	which	would	eventually	develop	into	an	internal	political	conflict	for	the	left	of	El	Salvador.125		
FMLN’s	Political	Successes	and	Difficulties:					The	dissention	of	the	movement	and	departure	of	the	ERP	and	RN	from	the	FMLN	in	1994	was	the	result	of	decision	to	change	to	a	9	out	of	15	majority	for	the	party’s	decision-making	process.	The	development	of	a	60	percent	threshold	led	to	the	ERP	and	RN	being	effectively	phased	out	by	the	FPL,	FAL,	and	PRTC	during	the	presidential	primary	for	the	1994	election.	During	these	elections,	the	FMLN	candidate,	Rubén	Zamora,	would	lose	to	ARENA’s	Armando	Calderón	Sol	in	a	close	runoff.	In	addition	to	this	loss	at	the	presidential	level,	the	FMLN	accrued	21	of	the	available	84	seats	in	the	National	assembly,	making	it	the	second	largest	party	to	ARENA,	but	not	affirming	their	strength	as	a	political	movement.126				
Following	a	restructuring	of	the	movement,	by	making	it	easier	for	the	political	party	to	allow	people	to	join	the	FMLN	and	not	have	to	seek	individual	groups	to	try	and	seek	entry	into	the	party.	This	reconstruction	helped	solidify	the	FMLN	as	one	heterogeneous	political	party	and	allowed	them	to	experience	more	success	during	the	following	election	cycle	in	1997.	This	election	cycle,	which	was																																																									125	Chávez,	Joaquín	M.	"How	Did	the	Civil	War	in	El	Salvador	End?"	1795.	126	Allison,	Michael	E.,	and	Alberto	Martín	Alvarez.	"Unity	and	Disunity	in	the	FMLN."	Latin	American	Politics	and	Society	54,	no.	4	(2012):	99-100.			
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the	first	one	where	the	PD	was	an	active	competitor	to	the	FMLN,	marked	an	increase	in	political	representation	for	the	FMLN.	Who	saw	an	increased	in	number	of	National	Assembly	seats	from	21	to	27,	and	a	15-35	increase	in	mayors,	gaining	political	control	of	capital	of	San	Salvador.127		
These	advances	marked	the	FMLN	successfully	surviving	the	defection	of	the	ERP	and	the	RN	from	their	party,	as	the	PD	only	managed	to	attain	1	percent	of	the	popular	vote	for	their	candidates	in	1997.	Differences	within	the	party	continued	with	the	presidential	election	of	1999,	where	the	FMLN	struggled	to	select	a	presidential	candidate.	After	much	internal	debate,	they	decided	on	Facundo	Guardado	and	Nidia	Díaz	as	the	vice	president	for	their	presidential	ticket.	This	led	to	an	unsuccessful	FMLN	primary,	as	they	only	captured	30	percent	of	the	popular	vote	and	lost	once	again	to	the	ARENA	candidate	Francisco	Flores.128											
	 Following	this	defeat	the	party,	it	was	still	able	to	increase	its	presence	in	the	legislative	and	municipal	elections	of	2000,	overcoming	ARENA	in	the	National	assembly	for	a	total	of	31	to	29	seats	in	the	national	assembly.	This	victory	marked	the	first	time	since	1989	that	ARENA	had	not	held	the	majority	of	seats	in	the	national	assembly.	The	following	elections	of	2002-2003	the	FMLN	also	achieved	great	success	maintaining	their	lead	against	ARENA	in	the	legislative	bloc	by	significantly	overtaking	them	in	opinion	polls	for	the	presidential	election	in	2004.	However,	following	the	legislative	election	cycle	the	FMLN	once	again	faced	great	internal	strife	and	the	selection	of	a	presidential	candidate	divided	the	entire																																																									127	Allison,	Michael	E.,	and	Alberto	Martín	Alvarez.	104.	128	Allison,	Michael	E.,	and	Alberto	Martín	Alvarez.	106.		
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movement.	The	candidate	that	the	FMLN	put	forward	for	the	2004	presidential	election	was	Schafik	Handal,	who	was	well	received	by	the	majority	of	FMLN	members,	but	faced	stiff	disapproval	from	the	general	public.	Handal	was	perceived	as	a	member	of	the	old	generation	of	the	FMLN.	As	the	ARENA	candidate,	Elías	Antonio	Saca,	represented	a	new	and	more	modern	approach	to	leadership	with	a	more	constructive	image.	Saca’s	desires	to	improve	their	relations	and	outreach	to	the	population	won	ARENA	the	election,	with	Handal	only	receiving	36	percent	of	the	vote.129							
	 This	defeat	forced	the	FMLN	to	create	a	unified	vision	for	their	political	party.	This	agreed	upon	position,	from	which	they	would	seek	to	communicate	their	desires	for	the	country,	was	a	Marxist-Leninist	platform.	This	cohesion	did	not	reflect	well	in	the	2006	election	period,	where	they	did	not	make	much	political	head	way,	but	the	united	vision	of	the	party	would	assist	them	in	future.	The	most	important	of	which	would	become	the	Presidential	election	of	2009.130		
	 On	September	11,	2007,	the	FMLN	announced	that	their	presidential	ticket	would	include	Mauricio	Funes	running	for	president	and	Sánchez	Cerén	as	his	vice	president	candidate.	The	selection	of	Funes	was	important	to	success	of	the	2009	campaign,	due	to	his	ability	to	gain	more	centrist	votes	for	the	FMLN.	Funes	was	a	journalist	and	not	a	member	of	the	FMLN,	but	had	expressed	great	interest	in	running	with	the	FMLN	party	since	2004.	With	the	death	of	Handal	in	2006	while	returning	from	Evo	Morales’s	inauguration,	and	the	political	unification	of	the																																																									129	Allison,	Michael	E.,	and	Alberto	Martín	Alvarez.		107-108.	130	Allison,	Michael	E.,	and	Alberto	Martín	Alvarez.	109.	
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socialist	left	of	the	FMLN	Funes	was	the	ideal	candidate	for	the	party.	In	the	2009	election	Funes,	with	the	FMLN	support	and	centrist	voters,	won	the	presidential	election	against	ARENA’s	Rodrigo	Avila	by	a	few	points,	51.3	to	48.7.131		
	 This	election	marked	the	first	time	that	a	candidate	from	the	FMLN	had	been	elected	to	the	presidency,	but	with	it	came	a	difficult	period	for	the	direction	of	the	party.	During	the	presidency	of	Funes	there	was	a	disagreement	between	the	FMLN	and	Funes	over	their	respective	domestic	policies	and	Funes’s	efforts	to	build	his	own	image	as	a	leader.	Funes	operated	in	an	independent	nature	because	in	El	Salvador	there	is	a	constitutional	law	in	place	that	doesn’t	allow	candidates	to	run	twice	in	a	row	for	presidency	through	the	same	group.132	This	law	led	the	FMLN	to	select	a	different	candidate	for	the	2014	presidential	election,	the	former	Vice	President,	Sánchez	Cerén.		
	 Cerén’s	candidacy	for	the	FMLN	signaled	a	return	of	the	guerilla	presence	because	of	his	status	as	a	commander	in	the	FMLN’s	guerilla	movement	during	the	revolution.	Cerén	however	sought	to	appease	concerns	that	he	would	seek	to	replicate	Húgo	Chávez	populist	policies,	by	affirming	that	he	wanted	to	position	himself	more	to	the	center	and	to	replicate	José	Mujica	of	Uruguay.	The	2014	presidential	election	between	Cerén	and	the	conservative	Norman	Quijano	was	a	tightly	contested	race	with	Cerén	narrowly	winning.	He	won	with	a	little	over	6,000	votes	and	his	election	led	to	many	accusations	of	political	corruption,	which	led	ARENA	to	initiate	several	legal	cases	to	contest	his	election.	The	result	was	that																																																									131	Allison,	Michael	E.,	and	Alberto	Martín	Alvarez.	110-111.		132	Allison,	Michael	E.,	and	Alberto	Martín	Alvarez.	112.	
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Cerén	won	the	election,	but	the	aftermath	of	the	close	race	caused	the	public	to	doubt	the	legitimacy	of	democracy,	leaving	a	scar	on	the	electoral	process	in	El	Salvador.133		
Data	examining	the	reception	of	Democracy	in	El	Salvador:		
	 When	examining	data	for	El	Salvador,	recorded	by	LatinoBarómetro,	there	are	several	different	points	that	stand	out	as	interesting	regarding	the	FMLN,	and	democracy	in	El	Salvador.	The	first	is	the	data	surrounding	citizen’s	political	allegiances	to	different	individual	parties.	The	poll	asked	if	you	had	to	vote	this	Sunday	for	a	political	party,	who	would	you	support.	In	1996,	which	was	when	the	FMLN	was	allowed	to	form	as	a	political	party,	only	7.4%	of	those	polled	said	the	FMLN	would	have	their	support,	while	19.9%	said	ARENA.	This	data	was	to	be	expected,	but	the	highest	group,	28.9%,	were	those	who	said	that	they	would	not	vote	at	all,	which	is	interesting	when	viewing	the	growth	of	the	FMLN.		
In	addition	to	this	voter	information,	LatinoBarómetro	also	polled	citizens	regarding	their	perception	of	politics	in	the	country	during	1996.	The	top	three	beliefs,	which	cumulatively	equaled	61.8%	of	the	total	population	sample,	were	indifference,	distrust	and	boredom,	in	that	order.	The	data	would	continue	to	reflect	this	belief	in	the	2002-2003	elections	with	the	combined	total	of	the	FMLN	and	
																																																								133	Partlow,	Joshua.	"Former	guerrilla	wins	presidential	vote	in	El	Salvador."	The	Washington	Post.	March	14,	2014.	Accessed	March	08,	2017.	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/former-guerrilla-commander-wins-el-salvador-presidential-election/2014/03/14/ddaa0dda-b77c-4f33-bb2d-225330c3745a_story.html?utm_term=.e6ddc349877d.		
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ARENA	equating	to	36.6%	and	those	not	voting	equaling	34.9%.	These	data	points	are	particularly	interesting	because	they	indicate	that	the	voter	population	still	didn’t	feel	represented	by	either	political	party.	These	trends	however	would	take	on	a	different	form	in	the	presidential	elections	of	2009.	This	cycle,	as	was	noted	previously,	was	the	first	time	a	FMLN	candidate	was	elected	to	become	the	president	of	the	country.		
	 The	data	trends	from	polls	done	by	LatinoBarómetro	in	2009	represented	a	positive	transition	for	democracy	within	El	Salvador.	One	such	poll,	in	response	to	a	question	regarding	the	power	of	the	individual’s	vote,	and	the	change	it	can	cause,	showed	that	76.4%	felt	their	vote	mattered,	while	19.6%	felt	that	their	vote	didn’t.	This	poll	marked	a	dramatic	improvement	to	the	same	poll	taken	in	1996,	at	the	beginning	of	the	FMLN	participating	in	El	Salvador’s	political	system,	where	45.6%	of	the	sample	felt	that	their	vote	held	no	significance	for	the	future.	Additionally,	the	overall	satisfaction	with	democracy	increased	from	1996	to	2009.	In	1996	40.6%	felt	unsatisfied	with	democracy,	and	26.8%	were	not	satisfied	at	all.	These	numbers	were	greatly	reduced	in	the	2009	poll,	with	42.3%	claiming	to	be	satisfied	and	17.8%	being	very	satisfied,	and	only	26%	felt	unsatisfied	and	10.1%	felt	very	unsatisfied.		
	 In	addition	to	these	political	improvements	in	the	perception	of	El	Salvador	becoming	a	democracy	during	the	rise	of	the	FMLN,	was	the	changing	perception	regarding	the	rigging	of	elections.	When	LatinoBarómetro	polled	El	Salvador	in	1997	a	resounding	54.2%	of	those	polled	felt	that	the	elections	at	the	time	were	
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rigged,	while	only	36.9%	felt	they	were	clean.	These	data	points	would	look	vastly	different	when	the	same	poll	was	asked	in	2009.	The	result	of	that	poll	was	how	62.3%	of	voters	felt	that	the	elections	were	clean	and	only	25.4%	of	those	asked	in	the	poll	felt	that	the	elections	system	was	rigged.	These	polls	show	that	democratization	in	El	Salvador,	which	included	the	FMLN,	was	moving	in	a	positive	direction.	A	positive	direction	that	would	face	a	serious	challenge	in	the	most	recent	2015	polls	regarding	the	development	of	democratic	institutions.	 	
While	the	data	from	1996-2009	showed	an	upward	trajectory	for	democracy,	the	data	following	the	election	of	2014,	and	the	controversy	that	surrounded	the	results,	reversed	the	progress	that	had	been	made	with	the	Salvadoran	voters.	The	data	regarding	the	most	recent	presidential	race	show	that	39.6%	of	the	sample	felt	it	was	fraudulent	and	10.9%	thought	it	was	very	fraudulent.	This	data	can	be	used	to	understand	other	polls	regarding	democracy,	and	how	support	and	satisfaction	for	democracy	were	recorded	at	their	lowest	points	since	2007.	With	these	points	being	acknowledged	not	all	the	data	for	democratic	trends	in	El	Salvador	are	negative.	
	 The	polls	regarding	support	for	a	democratic	system	of	government	were	still	positive,	with	48.8%	believing	that	it	was	the	best	and	11.5%	inclining	strongly	that	it	is	the	best	system	for	governance.	In	addition,	when	polled	about	the	impact	that	they	felt	their	vote	could	provide	the	feedback	was	positive.	The	result	was	that	54.1%	of	those	polled	felt	that	their	vote	would	influence	the	future,	and	the	structure	of	the	government,	with	37.9%	saying	that	they	didn’t	feel	their	vote	would	secure	any	change	in	government.	These	two	trends	represent	positive	
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perspectives	on	democracy	in	El	Salvador	today,	and	for	the	democratic	structure	moving	forward.	
Conclusion:	
	 The	overall	efforts	of	FMLN,	like	those	of	the	MLN-T	in	Uruguay,	have	created	a	positive	environment	for	democracy	in	El	Salvador,	and	improving	political	participation	in	the	democratic	process	has	been	crucial	to	this	development.	The	FMLN’s	efforts	since	they	initially	broke	from	the	communist	party	in	the	1970’s	to	take	up	arms	against	the	failing	El	Salvadoran	government	have	been	crucial	to	the	evolution	of	democracy.	The	FMLN	resisted	not	only	the	military	regime,	but	also	against	the	financial	aid	and	support	provided	by	the	U.S.	throughout	the	conflict.	The	FMLN	fought	against	these	forces	to	secure	a	position	in	the	government	that	meant	something	and	could	provide	meaningful	change.		
	 Upon	securing	a	peace	agreement	in	1992,	which	saw	their	vision	realized,	they	began	the	process	of	integrating	themselves	into	the	democratic	structure	of	El	Salvador.	In	1994,	the	FMLN	would	put	together	its	first	candidates	in	the	elections	for	local	seats	throughout	the	country.	The	FMLN	then	began	experiencing	success	during	these	and	subsequent	elections	throughout	the	following	ten	years.	Building	off	these	electoral	successes	the	FMLN	launched	a	successful	presidential	campaign	in	2009	with	Mauricio	Funes.	The	FMLN	would	follow	this	success	with	the	election	of	Sánchez	Cerén,	in	the	2014	presidential	election,	who	holds	office	currently	.		
	 When	examining	the	political	environment	of	El	Salvador	it	is	impossible	to	
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ignore	the	impact	of	the	FMLN.	It	was	a	guerilla	movement	that	went	from	being	an	anti-systemic	movement	by	taking	up	arms	against	political	corruption,	to	becoming	an	active	party	within	democracy	seeking	to	alter	the	government.	Through	their	efforts,	they	saw	their	political	ambitions	realized	and	changed	the	system	to	allow	their	beliefs	to	be	represented	in	El	Salvador.	The	FMLN	provided	legitimacy	to	democratization	in	El	Salvador	and	signaled	the	transition	from	authoritarian	politics	to	multi-party	democracy.	The	future	of	El	Salvador,	and	the	soundness	of	the	government’s	institutions,	is	now	being	guided	not	only	by	ARENA	and	El	Salvadorian	politician’s	but	also	by	the	FMLN	guerillas	who	once	fought	for	this	form	or	representative	democracy.	
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Epilogue			 Guerilla	movements	throughout	Latin	America	have	waged	war	for	different	reasons	and	in	widely	varying	situations.	In	this	paper	I	have	evaluated	three	different	guerilla	movements	the	FARC,	MLN-T,	and	the	FMLN.	These	three	groups	were	selected	because,	unlike	other	groups	throughout	Latin	American	history,	they	sought	to	transition	into	politics,	rather	than	transform	them	entirely.	Unlike	the	successful	revolutionary	movements	of	Cuba	and	Nicaragua,	and	the	unsuccessful	efforts	of	other	groups,	they	didn’t	seek	to	take	over	the	governmental	systems	they	were	opposing.	These	guerillas	rather	sought	to	become	members	of	the	political	institutions	and,	through	their	armed	resistance,	to	gain	entry	to	the	political	institutions	of	their	respective	countries.			 When	examining	these	groups,	it	is	helpful	to	gain	some	understanding	of	guerilla	warfare	in	a	global	sense,	and	how	other	movements	have	been	international	viewed.	To	compare	with	the	groups	examined	in	this	paper,	the	Umkhonto	we	Sizwe	(RK),	which	was	the	militant	branch	of	the	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	in	South	Africa	was	an	international	movement	that	resorted	to	violence	to	attain	their	goals.	Like	the	movements	that	have	been	described	in	the	paper,	the	ANC,	a	political	organization,	sought	to	be	a	part	of	the	government	that	had	no	desire	to	include	them	in	the	system.	In	the	1960’s	the	ANC	created	the	RK	branch	of	their	movement,	which	would	assume	the	military	operations.	Through	the	efforts	of	the	ANC,	the	RK,	and	international	support,	the	ANC	was	able	to	
	 		
	 66	
participate	in	the	South	African	political	system.134	The	ANC	and	the	RK	are	an	example	of		movements	that	used	the	violence	that	has	become	associated	with	guerilla	movements	of	Latin	America	to	attain	political	representation.	Like	the	RK	the	three	movements	described	in	this	paper	were	movements	that	used	armed	insurgency	as	a	way	of	attaining	political	representation	within	their	own	countries.				 The	Tupamaros,	an	urban	guerilla	movement	that	sought	to	oppose	an	undemocratic	and	brutal	dictatorship	in	Uruguay,	were	unable	to	achieve	military	success	or	an	immediate	negotiated	participation.	The	Tupamaros,	and	those	who	sought	democratization	in	Uruguay,	eventually	defeated	the	dictatorship,	and	achieved	their	goal	of	joining	the	political	system.	The	guerilla’s	participation	would	have	to	wait	until	democracy	was	restored	in	Uruguay,	but	the	MLN-T	party	would	eventually	attain	political	support	and	would	formally	enter	as	the	FA	coalition.	Their	participation	would	see	José	Mujica,	a	former	MLN-T	guerilla	leader	who	was	tortured	by	the	dictatorship	surviving	to	become	the	president	of	the	country.	The	guerillas	efforts	would	lead	a	political	coalition	of	parties	through	which	they	were	able	to	exert	direct	influence	over	the	government,	and	extend	access	to	all	the	politically	marginalized	in	Uruguay.	The	success	of	the	movement,	and	the	development	of	guerilla	leaders	shows	the	ability	of	non-state	actors	to	transition	and	become	formal	actors	within	the	government.		 As	was	the	case	with	Uruguay,	El	Salvador	was	a	country	that	was	rife	with	political	malpractice,	and	the	FMLN	moved	to	armed	resistance	to	attain	a																																																									134	Lissoni,	Arianna	.	"Transformations	in	the	ANC	External	Mission	and	Umkhonto	We	Sizwe,	C.	1960-1969."	Journal	of	Southern	African	Studies		
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resolution	to	address	the	military	regime.	This	rebellion,	which	resembled	the	movement	in	South	Africa	in	that	the	FMLN	had	a	political	and	militant	branch,	quickly	decided	to	follow	armed	insurrection	to	achieve	their	political	goals.	After	a	long	and	bloody	civil	war,	the	FMLN	and	the	El	Salvadoran	government	reached	an	agreement	that	saw	the	FMLN	gain	political	representation.	The	success	of	the	movement,	and	their	ability	to	transition	from	a	violent	actor	to	a	political	actor,	shows	the	ability	of	the	Tupamaros	to	become	formal	political	actors.			 This	idea	of	political	involvement	of	non-state	armed	actors	has	not	been	the	case	with	the	FARC	and	Colombia.	The	ideals	that	the	FARC	began	with,	to	combat	a	corrupt	governmental	structure	and	to	seek	to	enact	change	did	not	last	for	the	duration	of	the	movement.	When	the	group	was	allowed	to	form	the	UP	political	party,	their	involvement	in	the	government	was	a	complete	failure.	This	resulted	in	a	return	to	armed	resistance	to	combat	the	corruption	that	had	barred	them	from	political	participation.	Following	this	break	down	in	direct	political	involvement	the	group	diverged	from	their	initial	beliefs	and	have	only	recently	begun	renegotiating	with	the	government	to	seek	peaceful	reentry	into	society.	Part	of	their	negotiations,	includes,	in	a	similar	pattern	to	the	other	two	groups	discussed,	political	representation	within	the	government	and	the	ability	to	form	a	political	party.		 Guerilla	groups,	like	the	three	that	this	paper	has	discussed,	are	militant	groups	that	are	fighting	for	a	political	objective.	Whether	these	objectives	are	ideological	or	if	the	groups	are	fighting	to	attain	political	rights,	they	nonetheless	use	violent	resistance	as	a	way	of	attaining	their	goals.	In	my	paper,	I	have	shown	that	guerilla	movements,	while	they	began	as	informal	and	militant	movements,	can	
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integrate	and	become	positive	formal	parties	within	democratic	structures.	The	FMLN,	MLN-T,	and	the	FARC’s	UP	are	all	examples	describing	the	extent	to	which	guerillas	can	integrate	and	become	members	of	formal,	stable,	and	representative	democracies.	
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